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The European Commission has issued a Green Paper on the future of VAT. It be 
lieves that the Member States should strive towards simpler, more robust and 
e    cient VAT systems. The common VAT is distortionary, unnecessarily complex, 
and susceptible to fraud. Base broadening, rate uni   cation, and improvements 
in VAT coordination should be on the tax reform agendas of the Member States. 
The Commission invites submissions on a wide range of topics.
This volume contains three studies on the EU VAT. The    rst study aims at improv 
ing the understanding and dialogue on the VAT between lawyers, economists, 
and accountants. The second study analyses VAT fraud, particularly carousel 
fraud, evaluates various proposals that have been made to replace the current 
transitional regime by a de   nitive regime under which intracommunity supplies 
would be taxed in conjunction with a credit in the state of acquisition, and rev 
enue clearing between supply and acquisition states. The study argues that it 
is not the break in the VAT collection chain (the zero rating of intracommunity 
supplies) that is at the root of the problem, but the break in the VAT audit trail. 
Accordingly, it recommends the introduction and intensi   cation of cross border 
audits. The third study proposes that changes in the value of exempt immov 
able property should be included in the VAT base. This base extension should re 
place the highly inequitable and distortionary transfer and registration taxes and 
stamp duties that are currently levied on transactions in immovable property.
Sijbren Cnossen is advisor at CPB and professor in the economics faculty of the 
University of Pretoria. He is emeritus professor of economics of the University of 
Maastricht and emeritus professor of tax law of Erasmus University Ro   erdam. 
He has held appointments at the Law Schools of Harvard University and New 
York University, and at the College of Europe at Bruges. He started his career as 
a tax inspector in the Dutch Tax Service and was assistant division chief in the 
Fiscal A   airs Department of the International Monetary Fund. He has advised 
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Abstract in English 
This volume presents three studies on the VAT. The first study is a VAT primer for lawyers, 
economists, and accountants who rarely talk to each other about tax issues, particularly in the 
Netherlands. The different views illuminate the nature and workings of the VAT. The second 
study examines and evaluates VAT coordination in the EU against the backdrop of an analysis 
of VAT fraud. Carousel fraud is dwarfed by shadow economy fraud and contrived insolvency 
fraud. The taxation of intracommunity exports is not the solution to VAT coordination 
problems. Rather the focus should be on cross-border VAT audit, followed up, if necessary, by 
investigation and prosecution of fraudsters. The third study argues that value changes in exempt 
immovable property should be brought into the VAT base, similar to value changes in other 
second-hand goods that are traded by taxable dealers. This extension of the VAT base should 
replace the inequitable and distortionary transfer or registration taxes and stamp duties on 
transactions in immovable property that are currently levied in the various member states. 
 
Key words: VAT , European Union, VAT coordination, carousel fraud, retail sales tax, 
consumption taxes, VAT treatment of housing 
 
JEL code: H2, H7, K34 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Deze bundel bevat drie studies over de BTW. De eerste studie is een kort begrip van de BTW 
voor juristen, economen, en accountants die zelden met elkaar praten over 
belastingvraagstukken, met name in Nederland. De verschillende zienswijzen werpen licht op 
de aard en de werking van de BTW. De tweede studie onderzoekt en beoordeelt de coördinatie 
van de BTW in de EU tegen de achtergrond van een analyse van BTW-fraude. De belasting van 
intracommunautaire uitvoer is niet de oplossing voor BTW-coördinatieproblemen. In plaats 
daarvan dient de aandacht zich te richten op grensoverschrijdend boekenonderzoek en, zo 
nodig, opsporing en vervolging van fraudeurs. De derde studie pleit er voor om 
waardeveranderingen van vrijgesteld onroerend goed in de BTW-heffingsgrondslag te 
betrekken, zoals ook gebeurt met tweedehands goederen die door BTW-plichtige personen 
worden verhandeld. Deze uitbreiding van de heffingsgrondslag dient in de plaats te komen van 
de unfaire en verstorende overdrachts- of registratiebelastingen en zegelrechten op transacties in  
onroerend goed die thans door de verschillende lidstaten worden geheven. 
 
Steekwoorden: BTW, Europese Unie, BTW-coördinatie, carrouselfraude, kleinhandelsbelasting, 
consumptiebelastingen, BTW-behandeling van woningen THREE VAT STUDIES:  
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Preface 
 
Recently, the European Commission has issued a Green Paper on the future of VAT in the 
European Union. It believes that the Member States should aspire towards simpler, more robust 
and efficient VAT systems. Having been harmonised in 1977, long before the internet and the 
onset of globalisation, the common VAT appears an anachronistic tax compared with modern 
VATs in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Singapore. The exemptions and 
differentiated rates that are prevalent throughout the EU violate the logic and functionality of 
the VAT. More importantly, they are highly distortionary and greatly complicate the 
administration and compliance with the tax.  
 
The three studies in this volume attempt to make a contribution towards a better understanding 
of the VAT. The first study does this by analysing the nature and role of the VAT and 
comparing the views of lawyers, economists, and accountants. Base broadening and domestic 
rate unification should be high on the tax reform agendas of the Member States. Two issues, 
that is, VAT coordination aspects and the treatment of exempt immovable property are singled 
out for separate treatment. The study presents evidence that domestic shadow economy fraud 
and contrived insolvency fraud are far more important than carousel fraud, which receives so 
much attention. Little can be said in favour of some form of exporter rating, that is, the 
imposition of VAT on intracommunity supplies and a credit for VAT on intracommunity 
acquisitions, together with the payment of the VAT collected by supply states to acquisition 
states (to maintain the destination principle, that is, revenue allocation to the state of 
consumption). Instead, present arrangements should be retained, although compliance control 
should be extended across borders in the form of joint audits. Finally, the author proposes to 
replace the current inequitable and highly distortionary transfer, registration and stamp duties 
on immovable property by the imposition of the VAT on changes in the value of exempt 
immovable property. This would eliminate the cascade effects of the current taxes and duties, 
although the locked-in effect would remain. The proposal merits further consideration. 
 
The studies, written by Sijbren Cnossen at CPB, are based on papers presented at conferences 
held in Vienna, Washington DC, and Oxford, and published in the related proceedings. The 
author wishes to thank the organisers of the conferences for their support, and Jeannette 
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Summary 
VAT primer for lawyers, economists, and accountants 
Lawyers, economists, and accountants with a grounding in taxation hardly talk to each other 
about professional issues, particularly in the Netherlands. Each profession tends to confine the 
circle of discussion to colleagues with a similar educational background. Joint conferences to 
learn from each other’s insights and experiences are rare. The value-added tax (VAT) is a good 
example of this insular attitude. The first paper in this volume attempts to bridge the gap 
between the three professions by articulating and comparing the views that are peculiar to each 
group. In practice, lawyers view the VAT as a tax on transactions, emphasizing the importance 
of unambiguous legislation on who should be taxed, on what, where, and to what extent. In the 
process, the nature of the VAT and its economic effects and costs tend to overlooked. 
Economists, on the other hand, are aware of the economic distortions of exemptions and 
differentiated rate structures, but tend to be dismissive of the legal design requirements for a 
good tax, which are essential for tax certainty. Economists enhance the understanding of the 
VAT by showing that it is a tax on labour income and business cash flow. Unlike the income 
tax, the VAT does not tax the normal rate of return on capital. Accountants emphasize that the 
VAT is not a cost for business. It does not enter a business firm’s profit & loss account, 
although this account can be used to calculate the VAT liability. There is much to be learned 
from the views of the various professions. 
 
As background to these views, the paper outlines the nature and basic workings of the VAT and 
other broad-based consumption taxes by reference to a stylized example of the production-
distribution process. Given identical bases and rates, it is shown that exactly the same amount 
of tax can be levied under a retail sales tax (RST), a direct subtraction method tax levied on the 
difference between sales and purchases, an addition method tax imposed on the sum of wages 
and business cash flow, a flat tax applied to business cash flow combined with a tax on 
individual wage earners, and a personal expenditure tax levied on the difference between 
incomings and savings. Although in theory identical, design and feasibility considerations have 
important implications for the ability to achieve basic tax objectives, such as fairness, neutrality, 
revenue allocation to the country of consumption, minimization of administration and 
compliance costs, and political robustness with respect to the various taxes. The comparative 
review indicates that the VAT emerges as the consumption tax of choice. It is a highly neutral, 
productive, stable, and flexible source of government revenue. Not surprisingly, the VAT is 
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VAT coordination in common markets and federations: Lessons from the European 
experience 
While there is wide agreement on the basic design features of a VAT, the consensus on the most 
appropriate way to coordinate the VATs levied by different taxing jurisdictions is smaller. 
Some believe that an RST, which is inherently destination-based, is the best consumption tax in 
a common market without border controls or in a federation. The RST is found in 45 out 50 
states in the United States and in 3 out of 10 provinces in Canada. It has also been advocated by 
Germany and Austria as a solution to the problem of carousel fraud, that is, the VAT-free 
importation of goods from other states and their subsequent sale, inclusive of VAT in the 
domestic market, but without payment of the VAT collected from the purchaser to the tax 
authorities. To begin, this paper, basically written for American readers, shows that the VAT is 
to be preferred over the RST, essentially because it is more conducive in distinguishing exempt 
producer use of goods and services from taxable consumer use; hence, it is a more neutral tax. 
Also, the multistage collection feature of the VAT means that large firms collect most of the tax 
paid by the consumer on behalf of the tax office, in contrast to an RST under which retailers 
remit the full tax to the tax authorities, although they are the weakest link in the tax collection 
process. The preference of VAT over RST is backed up by the experience of various countries, 
which were faced with the choice. 
 
Some continue to prefer the RST, because it is inherently destination-based and does not seem 
to require border tax adjustments (exports exempt, imports taxed). Accordingly, it is argued, an 
RST is not susceptible to carousel fraud. Currently, in the absence of (physical) customs 
controls, these border tax adjustments are effected through the accounts of exporters and 
importers under the so-called deferred payment system. The system requires purchasers of out-
of-state goods and services to self-assess the VAT. Instead of the seller being liable to account 
for the VAT (the normal procedure), the buyer has to account for the tax (and give himself a 
credit at the same time). This is called reverse-charging. The European Commission has long 
sought to replace the deferred payment system, called transitional regime, by a definitive 
regime under which the exporter is taxed, the importer receives a credit for the exporter’s tax, 
and the exporting country remits the VAT collected from the exporter to the importing country 
– a regime which is called ‘exporter rating’. Various high-profile exporter rating proposals have 
also been made in the tax literature, which go by the names of Viable Integrated VAT 
(VIVAT), Compensating VAT (CVAT), and Dual VAT (D-VAT). 
 
This study argues that the current deferred payment system is to be preferred over any of the 
exporter rating proposals. Basically, it is not the break in the VAT-collection chain (the zero-
rating upon export), which undermines the efficacy of the VAT, but the break in the VAT-audit 
trail. This break can be repaired by extending the jurisdictional reach of each state’s VAT 
administration through cross-border audits, followed up, if indicated, by investigations and 
prosecutions. Replacing deferred payment by exporter rating simply would shift fraudulent     SUMMARY 
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practices from the export stage to the import stage through the use of false invoices showing 
VAT credits. Perhaps, it is time to put the various exporter rating proposals, which have 
dominated the debate for the last 20 years, to rest.  
 
The study also shows that the size of carousel fraud is much smaller than shadow economy 
fraud, that is, the VAT-free provision of all kinds of personal services, ranging from home and 
car repairs to hairdressing and consultancy services in violation of the law. Understandably but 
incorrectly, carousel fraud receives so much attention because it is a mafia type of activity 
involving few transactions but large sums of money. By contrast, shadow economy fraud – 
much larger in terms of VAT revenue foregone – entails numerous small transactions across the 
whole spectrum of personal services provision. Germany and Austria have proposed to solve 
the smaller problem, that is, carousel fraud, by reverse-charging the VAT throughout the entire 
production-distribution process (effectively transforming it into an RST) and backing this up 
with a pervasive Stasi-like monitoring system under which the details of every transaction have 
to be fed into a central computer to match the VAT on purchases of one taxable person with the 
VAT on sales of some other taxable person. Drawing on the Chinese and Korean experience, 
the study argues that wholesale data matching is largely unproductive and does not uncover 
fraudulent practices. In short, it is no substitute for comprehensive audit. 
Improving the VAT treatment of exempt immovable property in the European Union 
The European VAT, harmonised in 1977 (before the internet and globalization) and not 
changed since then, is riddled with largely senseless exemptions and differentiated rate 
structures. It is an anachronism compared with modern VATs found in, for instance, New 
Zealand, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and Singapore. One of the most difficult areas 
concerns the appropriate treatment of immovable property. Since rental values and by extension 
rents cannot be taxed, the value of newly created immovable property is taxed instead. At the 
time of creation, the tax on the full value equals the tax on the discounted present value of all 
future building services. Subsequent transactions in immovable property are exempt from VAT, 
although taxable persons can elect to include business property in the VAT base, meaning that a 
VAT credit is available for purchases and that tax must be charged on sales.  
 
The exemption of transactions in residential property and business property (unless use is made 
of the tax option) implies, however, that future increases (and decreases) in the value of the 
property are left out of the VAT base. This hole in the VAT’s coverage can be repaired by 
taxing the increase in property values (and refunding the tax on the decrease in property values 
falling below the taxed acquisition price). The VAT on the increase/decrease in value should 
replace the current transfer/registration duty on the sale of immovable property (although 
consideration could be given to retaining the tax collection mechanism of the duty). The 
transfer duty is a highly inequitable and distortionary element in the tax system, which can be 
likened to a cumulative turnover tax that is levied whenever there is a change in the ownership THREE VAT STUDIES: SUMMARY 
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of property. This verdict applies also to the crazy quilt of stamp duties found in most EU 
member states. These anachronistic levies should be abolished, the sooner the better. Another 
improvement would be to tax all non-residential property sales (and to abolish the tax option), 
which is what is done under modern VATs. Last but not least, a strong case can be made for 
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  Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
Kort begrip van de BTW voor juristen, economen, en accountants 
Juristen, economen, en accountants onderlegd in de belastingheffing praten bijna niet met elkaar 
over beroepsmatige vraagstukken, zeker niet in Nederland. Elke beroepsgroep is geneigd de 
discussiekring te beperken tot collegae met eenzelfde educatieve achtergrond. 
Gemeenschappelijke conferenties om van elkaars inzichten en ervaringen te leren zijn 
zeldzaam. De BTW is een goed voorbeeld van deze kortzichtige houding. De eerste studie in dit 
geschrift probeert de kloof tussen de drie beroepsgroepen te verkleinen door de verschillende 
zienswijzen te articuleren en te vergelijken. In de praktijk beschouwen juristen de BTW als een 
belasting op transacties en benadrukken zij het belang van ondubbelzinnige wet- en regelgeving 
omtrent wie dient te worden belast, waarover, waar, en in welke mate. Daarbij worden de aard 
van de BTW en haar economische effecten en kosten veelal over het hoofd gezien. Economen, 
aan de andere kant, zijn zich bewust van de economische verstoringen van vrijstellingen en 
gedifferentieerde tariefstructuren, maar neigen er toe geringschattend te doen over de wettelijke 
vormgeving van een goede belasting, die van essentieel belang is voor de rechtszekerheid. 
Economen dragen bij aan een beter begrip van de BTW door er op te wijzen dat zij een 
belasting is over arbeidsinkomen en ondernemingscashflow. In tegenstelling tot de 
inkomstenbelasting, belast de BTW niet de normale beloningsvoet van kapitaal. Accountants 
benadrukken dat de BTW geen kostenpost is voor de onderneming. Zij komt niet in de verlies- 
en winstrekening van een onderneming voor, hoewel die rekening wel kan worden gebruikt om 
de BTW-verplichting te berekenen. Er valt veel te leren van de zienswijzen van de 
verschillende beroepsgroepen. 
 
Als achtergrond voor deze zienswijzen, schetst de studie de aard en de basiskenmerken van de 
BTW en andere brede consumptiebelastingen aan de hand van een gestileerd voorbeeld van het 
productie-distributieproces. Gegeven identieke grondslagen en tarieven wordt aangetoond dat 
precies eenzelfde bedrag aan belasting kan worden geheven onder een kleinhandelsbelasting, 
een subtractiebelasting over het verschil tussen verkopen en inkopen, een optelbelasting over de 
som van lonen en ondernemingscashflow, een vlaktaks over de ondernemingscashflow 
gecombineerd met een belasting van individuele loontrekkers, en een persoonlijke 
consumptiebelasting geheven over het verschil tussen ontvangsten en besparingen. Hoewel in 
theorie identiek, zijn de mogelijkheden en beperkingen die verband houden met de vorm en de 
uitvoering van de onderscheidene belastingen van groot belang bij het in de praktijk brengen 
van elementaire doelstellingen van belastingheffing, zoals fairness, neutraliteit, 
opbrengsttoewijzing aan het land van consumptie, minimalisatie van administratieve en 
nalevingskosten, en politieke weerbaarheid. De vergelijkende beschouwing geeft aan dat de 
BTW de voorkeur verdient. Zij is in hoge mate een neutrale, productieve, stabiele en flexibele 
bron van overheidsinkomsten. Het wekt dan ook geen verbazing dat de BTW is ingevoerd in 
zo’n 150 landen rond de wereld. THREE VAT STUDIES: SUMMARY 
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BTW-coördinatie in gemeenschappelijke markten en federaties: Lessen uit Europa 
Hoewel er in het algemeen overeenstemming is over de grondtrekken van een goede BTW, is 
de consensus over de meest geëigende manier om de BTW te coördineren tussen verschillende 
landen geringer. Sommigen zijn van oordeel dat de kleinhandelsbelasting de beste 
consumptiebelasting in een gemeenschappelijk markt is zonder douanecontroles of in een 
federatie. De kleinhandelsbelasting wordt geheven in 45 van 50 staten in de Verenigde Staten 
en in 3 van de 10 Canadese provincies. Zij is ook naar voren geschoven door Duitsland en 
Oostenrijk als oplossing voor het probleem van carrouselfraude, dat wil zeggen, de BTW-vrije 
invoer van goederen uit andere staten, die vervolgens met BTW op de binnenlandse markt 
worden afgezet, echter zonder de door de koper betaalde BTW af te dragen aan de 
belastingdienst. Om te beginnen, toont deze, voornamelijk voor Amerikaanse lezers geschreven 
studie, aan dat de BTW de voorkeur verdient boven de kleinhandelsbelasting, omdat zij in 
beginsel beter een onderscheid kan maken tussen vrijgesteld producentenverbruik van goederen 
en belast consumentenverbruik; daarom is het een neutralere belasting. Ook betekent de 
gefractioneerde inning van de BTW dat grote ondernemingen het leeuwendeel van de door de 
consument betaalde belasting afdragen, in tegenstelling tot een kleinhandelsbelasting waaronder 
kleinhandelaren de volle mep aan de belastingdienst dienen te betalen, ook al zijn zij de zwakste 
schakel in de keten van belastinginning. De voorkeur van de BTW boven de 
kleinhandelsbelasting blijkt ook uit de overwegingen van verschillende landen die tussen een 
BTW en een kleinhandelsbelasting konden kiezen.  
 
Echter, sommigen blijven de voorkeur geven aan een kleinhandelsbelasting, omdat zij van 
nature naar de bestemming wordt geheven. Grenscorrecties om de uitvoer van belasting te 
schonen en de invoer te belasten zouden niet nodig zijn. Daarom, zo wordt beweerd, is een 
kleinhandelsbelasting minder gevoelig voor carrouselfraude. Na de afschaffing van (fysieke) 
douanecontroles in de EU, worden grenscorrecties thans geëffectueerd via de boekhoudingen 
van exporteurs en importeurs onder de zogenoemde verleggingsregeling. Deze regeling eist dat 
kopers van uit andere landen geïmporteerde goederen en diensten zichzelf aanslaan voor de 
daarover verschuldigde BTW. In plaats van dat de verkoper verantwoordelijk is voor de heffing 
(de normale procedure), is het de koper die zichzelf de belasting in rekening dient te brengen 
(terwijl hij zichzelf tegelijkertijd een belastingaftrek voor hetzelfde bedrag kan verlenen). Dit 
wordt wel ‘reverse-charging’ genoemd. De Europese Commissie heeft lang geprobeerd de 
verleggingsregeling, overgangsregime genoemd, te vervangen door een definitieve regeling 
waaronder de uitvoerder wordt belast, de invoerder een aftrek krijgt voor de aan de uitvoerder 
betaalde belasting, en het uitvoerland de BTW van de uitvoerder afdraagt aan het invoerland – 
een regime dat met ‘exporter rating’ wordt aangeduid. In de literatuur zijn voorstellen van 
eenzelfde strekking gedaan onder de etiketten van ‘Viable Integrated VAT’ (VIVAT), 
‘Compensating VAT’ (CVAT), en ‘Dual VAT’ (D-VAT). 
     SUMMARY 
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Deze studie beargumenteert dat de huidige verleggingsregeling de voorkeur verdient boven 
welk exporter-rating voorstel dan ook. In principe is het niet de breuk in het BTW-
inningsproces (de nultarifering bij uitvoer) die de doeltreffendheid van de BTW ondermijnt, 
maar de breuk in het controlesysteem. Deze breuk kan worden gerepareerd door de 
controlespanne van elke staat te vergroten door middel van boekenonderzoek over de grens, en, 
zo nodig, opsporing en vervolging. De vervanging van de verleggingsregeling door exporter-
rating zou de frauduleuze praktijk eenvoudig verleggen van de uitvoer naar de invoer door het 
gebruik van vervalste inkoopfacturen waarop belastingaftrek staat genoteerd. Wellicht is het 
moment gekomen om de verschillende exporter-rating voorstellen, die het debat van de 
afgelopen 20 jaar hebben gedomineerd, in de la te leggen. 
 
De studie toont ook aan dat de omvang van carrouselfraude veel kleiner is dan de fraude in het 
binnenlandse informele circuit (en gekunstelde faillissementsfraude) in de vorm van allerlei 
vormen van BTW-vrije persoonlijke dienstverlening, van woning- en autoreparaties tot 
kappers- en adviesdiensten – in strijd met de wet. Begrijpelijkerwijs maar ten onrechte, krijgt 
carrouselfraude zoveel aandacht, omdat het een maffia-achtige activiteit is bestaande uit een 
gering aantal transacties waarmee veel geld gemoeid is. In tegenstelling gaat het bij de 
informele circuitfraude, waarmee een veelvoud van BTW is gemoeid, om een groot aantal 
kleine transacties die het hele spectrum van de persoonlijke dienstverlening beslaan. Duitsland 
en Oostenrijk hebben voorgesteld het kleinere probleem, dat wil zeggen, carrouselfraude, aan te 
pakken door de verleggingsregeling verplicht te stellen voor het hele productie-distributieproces 
(waarmee de BTW een kleinhandelsbelasting wordt), ondersteund door een Stasi-achtig 
controlesysteem waarbij de details van elke transactie in een centrale computer moeten worden 
ingevoerd om de BTW van kopers en verkopers met elkaar te kunnen vergelijken. Onder 
verwijzing naar de Chinese en Koreaanse ervaringen op dit gebied, vestigt de studie er de 
aandacht op dat grootscheepse datavergelijking grotendeels onproductief is en echte fraude niet 
op het spoor komt. Om kort gaan, het is geen substituut voor grondige boekhoudcontroles. 
Verbetering van de BTW-behandeling van vrijgesteld onroerend goed in de Europe Unie 
De Europese BTW, geharmoniseerd in 1977 (lang voor het internet en de globalisering) en 
sindsdien niet veranderd, is doorschoten met grotendeels zinloze vrijstellingen en 
gedifferentieerde tariefstructuren. Zij is een anachronisme vergeleken met de moderne BTW’s 
in, bijvoorbeeld, Nieuw Zeeland, Canada, Zuid Afrika, Australië en Singapore. Een van de 
meer problematische aspecten betreft de geëigende behandeling van onroerend goed. Omdat 
huurwaarden en in het verlengde daarvan huren niet kunnen worden belast, wordt in plaats 
daarvan de waarde van nieuw gebouwd onroerend goed in de heffing betrokken. Op het 
moment van oplevering is de belasting over de nieuwwaarde gelijk aan de belasting over de 
verdisconteerde tegenwoordige waarde van alle toekomstige huisvestingsdiensten van het goed. 
Daaropvolgende transacties in gebruikt onroerend goed zijn vrijgesteld van BTW, hoewel 
belastingplichtigen er voor kunnen kiezen om zakelijk gebruikt onroerend goed in de THREE VAT STUDIES: SUMMARY 
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heffingsgrondslag te betrekken, hetgeen betekent dat de belasting bij aankoop kan worden 
afgetrokken en dat belasting geheven dient te worden bij verkoop. 
 
De vrijstelling van transacties van in gebruik genomen woningen en zakelijk onroerend goed 
(tenzij gebruik wordt gemaakt van de belastingoptie) impliceert echter dat de toekomstige 
toename (en afname) van de waarde van onroerend goed, gerealiseerd bij verkoop, niet in de 
heffing wordt betrokken, hoewel dat wel zou moeten. Dit gat in de BTW-heffingsgrondslag kan 
worden gerepareerd door BTW te heffen over de waardetoename van gebruikt onroerend goed 
(en de BTW terug te geven indien de waarde daalt beneden de belaste aankoopprijs). De BTW 
over de toename/afname zou in de plaats moeten komen van de huidige overdrachtsbelasting 
geheven bij de verkoop van onroerend goed (onder handhaving van het inningsmechanisme van 
de overdrachtsbelasting). De overdrachtsbelasting is een buitengewoon unfair en verstorend 
element in het belastingstelsel dat kan worden vergeleken met een cumulatieve omzetbelasting 
die wordt geheven telkens wanneer onroerend goed wordt overgedragen. Dit oordeel gaat ook 
op voor de lappendeken van zegelrechten die in de meeste EU-landen voorkomt. Deze 
anachronistische heffingen dienen te worden afgeschaft, hoe eerder hoe beter. Een andere 
verbetering zou zijn om alle transacties in zakelijk onroerend goed aan de BTW te onderwerpen 
(en de belastingoptie af te schaffen), hetgeen de vigeur is onder moderne BTW’s. Ten slotte kan 
een sterk pleidooi worden gehouden voor de toepassing van het standaardtarief over de volle 
breedte van transacties in of gerelateerd aan onroerend goed.  
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1  VAT primer for lawyers, economists, and accountants
1 
On the basis of a comparative analysis of various broad-based consumption taxes, this paper argues that 
the value-added tax (VAT), which has been adopted by more than 150 countries, is the preferred form of 
consumption tax. The nature and workings of the VAT can be illustrated by the perceptions that lawyers, 
economists, and accountants have of the tax. Lawyers emphasize that the VAT is a transactions-based tax. 
Economists point out that the VAT is a tax on wages and business cash flow. Accountants show that the 
VAT is accounts-controlled, just like the business income tax. The world-wide experience with the VAT 
indicates that its base should be designed as broadly as possible and that it should be levied at a single, 
uniform rate. 
1.1  Introduction 
The value-added tax (VAT) is the consumption tax of choice of some 150 countries. With the 
exception of the United States (U.S.), all countries that are member of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have a VAT, including the partners of the 
U.S. in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – Canada and Mexico. In the 
European Union (EU), which comprises 27 member states, the adoption of the VAT is a 
prerequisite for membership because it is uniquely equipped to tax imports on par with 
domestically produced goods and services and to free exports from tax.  
 
This paper examines the nature and workings of the VAT by comparing it with other broad-
based consumption taxes. The paper contains four sections. Following this introduction, the 
second section discusses the different forms of consumption tax. In theory, the base of the 
various consumption taxes is the same; hence, their economic impact and revenue yield should 
not differ. In practice, however, open economy aspects and feasibility constraints imply that 
there are important differences among them. The VAT emerges as the preferred choice, 
primarily because it is the most neutral and feasible alternative. The VAT does not affect the 
forms and methods of doing business or, more broadly, trade and investment, and does not 
discriminate between domestically produced and foreign-made products. Importantly, the VAT 
is not a cost to business. 
 
These observations form the background for a discussion in the third section of how the tax is 
perceived by lawyers, economists, and accountants. Lawyers emphasize that the VAT is a tax 
on transactions – sales and purchases – made by registered businesses. This requires clear 
definitions of who should be taxed, on what, where, when, and to what extent. In short, 
 
1 This paper was originally presented at a conference on Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation: Similarities and Differences, 
organized by the Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law in Vienna, 26-28 March 2009. Subsequently, the paper was 
published in Tax Notes International (27 July 2009) and included in the proceedings of the conference, which were edited by 
Michael Lang, Peter Melz and Eleonor Kristoffersson, and published in 2009 by Amsterdam’s International Bureau for Fiscal 
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unambiguous legislation is essential if the VAT is to be effectively implemented. Economists 
argue that the VAT is a tax on labour income and the business cash flow component of capital 
income. Unlike the income tax, the VAT does not include the normal or hurdle rate of return on 
capital in its base; that is, at the margin, it does not interfere with investment. As accountants 
show, consumption taxes can be best understood by working through the intricacies of a profit 
& loss (P&L) account in determining the tax bases and liabilities. It appears that there is much 
to learn from the insights provided by the views of the various professions. Finally, the fourth 
section sums up the three major lessons learned from world-wide experience. It is important 
that the VAT should be as broadly based as possible and that a single rate apply to all 
transactions. Only exports should be freed of tax.  
 
Note that this paper is a primer on VAT, not a detailed treatment of all its legal aspects, 
economic effects, or political implications. Readers whose appetite has been wetted should refer 
to Ebrill et al (2001); Schenk and Oldman (2007); Bird and Gendron (2007); Crawford, Keen 
and Smith (2010); and the many references cited in these publications. 
1.2  Broad-based consumption taxes 
Much can be learned about the VAT by comparing it with other broad-based consumption 
taxes. Therefore, this section defines the various forms of consumption tax that can be 
distinguished. This is followed by an exposition of the computation of the tax base of each 
consumption tax, highlighting its equivalence with other consumption taxes. Subsequently, the 
practical and economic differences between the various taxes are noted. The VAT emerges as 
the consumption tax of choice, a view that finds support in the VAT’s prevalence around the 
world.  
1.2.1  Forms of consumption tax 
The nature of the VAT can be best understood by comparing it to the following broad-based 
consumption taxes, which are levied or have been proposed in the U.S., the EU, or in the tax 
literature. 
 
•  A retail sales tax (RST) that is applied to sales of goods and services by registered businesses to 
consumers and unregistered entities.  
•  A credit-invoice method of VAT that taxes all sales by registered businesses but permits these 
businesses a credit (deduction) for the tax on purchases (including investment goods) invoiced 
by other registered businesses against the tax on sales.  
•  A direct subtraction method tax (also called business transfer tax (BTT) in the U.S.) that 
permits registered businesses to deduct purchases (including investment goods) from other     BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAXES 
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registered businesses from sales and that taxes the difference between sales and purchases 
directly rather than indirectly as under the VAT.
2  
•  An addition method tax that taxes aggregate wages as well as residual value added (capital 
income) by registered businesses as computed from their P&L accounts. 
•  A flat tax, much discussed in the U.S. tax literature, that allows registered businesses to deduct 
wages from value added as calculated under the direct subtraction method, but that taxes these 
wages at the level of individual wage earners (permitting a basic exemption). Residual value 
added is taxed at the business level, without an exemption – hence the name “flat tax.” 
•  A personal expenditure tax that taxes expenditures on goods and services at the level of the 
taxpaying individual by subtracting savings (including loan repayments and purchases of 
stocks, bonds and non-residential real estate) from aggregate incomings (including loan receipts 
and proceeds from the sale of assets), both calculated on a cash-flow basis.  
 
1.2.2  Equivalence of consumption taxes   
The equivalence of the various consumption taxes can be illustrated best by reference to the 
stylized example in table 1.1, which traces the manufacture and sale of the desk at which the 
first draft of this paper was written.
3 Following the production and distribution cycle, we start 
with the lumber company P (the primary producer), who sells wood to the furniture 
manufacturer M, who delivers the desk to the wholesaler W, who distributes it to the furniture 
store R (the retailer), who in turn puts the desk at our disposal. For simplicity, it is assumed that 
each stage purchases the whole output of the previous stage and that P has zero inputs. 
 
In each stage, the value of the inputs increases by the value of labour (wages) and capital (to be 
defined below) applied in the production or distribution of the desk. In terms of the example: 
A.2 + A.3 = A.1, which can also be written as: A.3 = A.1 – A.2. In other words, value added is 
identical to the difference between sales and purchases. Consequently, at the final (retail) stage, 
the sum of all values added throughout the production-distribution process, and, by the same 
token, the sum of all the differences between sales and purchases (in either case, €2.000 in the 
example), equals the consumer price, exclusive of tax. 
 
 
2 In this paper, the acronym VAT is reserved for the credit-invoice method of consumption tax, although, in principle, the 
direct subtraction method tax, the addition method tax and the flat tax also can be considered variants of value added 
taxation. 
3 The example is based on Cnossen (1998). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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Table 1.1  Tax liabilities under various forms of consumption tax levied at a rate of 10% (in €) 
Basic information/kind of tax  P  M  W  R  Total 
           
A. Transactions (exclusive of tax)           
     1. Sales  400  1.200  1.400  2.000  - 
     2. Purchases  0  400  1.200  1.400  - 
     3. Value added (A.1 – A.2)  400  800  200  600  - 
         a. Wages  (380)  (750)  (190)  (560)  - 
         b. Capital income  (20)  (50)  (10)  (40)  - 
           
B. Retail sales tax              
     4. Tax on retail sales (10% of A.1/R)  -  -  -  200  200 
           
C. Value-added tax (VAT)           
     5. Tax on sales (10% of A.1)  40  120  140  200  500 
     6. Tax on purchases (10% of A.2)  0  40  120  140  300 
     7. Net tax (C.5 – C.6)  40  80  20  60  200 
           
D. Direct subtraction method tax           
     8. Tax on sales minus purchases (10% of A.3)         40  80  20  60  200 
           
E. Addition method tax           
     9. Tax on aggregate wages (10% of A.3a)     38  75  19  56  188 
   10. Tax on capital income (10% of A.3b)  2  5  1  4  12 
   11. Total tax  40  80  20  60  200 
           
F. Flat tax            
   12. Tax on individual wages (10% of A.3a)
a  38  75  19  56  188 
   13. Tax on capital income (10% of A.3b)  2  5  1  4  12 
   14. Total tax   40  80  20  60  200 
           
Source: Adapted from McLure (1989). 
a 
Ignoring the basic exemption applied at the individual level. 
 
The example incorporates a number of accounting identities, which are worth repeating because 
they are fundamental to a good understanding of the VAT. Thus, the consumer price is always 
equal to the algebraic sum of all values added, is always equal to the sum of the differences 
between sales and purchases, and is always equal to the sum of wage payments and capital 
income. If this is borne in mind, it will readily be apparent that exactly the same total tax can be 
collected in either of two ways: 
 
•  In full under a retail sales tax. 
•  Fractionally throughout the production-distribution process by confining the tax to the value 
added at each stage. In turn, the fractional or multistage collection technique can be 
implemented in either of four ways: 
 
•  Indirectly by crediting the tax on purchases against the tax on sales under the indirect 
subtraction technique, called credit-invoice VAT; 
•  Directly by subtracting purchases from sales and applying the tax rate to the difference 
under the direct subtraction method;     BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAXES 
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•  Directly by taxing aggregate labour income and capital income jointly at the business level 
under the addition method; or 
•  Directly by taxing labour income and capital income separately at the individual and 
business level, respectively, under what is called the flat tax.  
 
Table 1.1 illustrates these accounting identities. Under the basic assumption that the tax base 
and tax rate are identical, the total net tax collected under a retail stage tax (that is, €200, line 
B.4) equals the tax collected throughout the production-distribution process under the VAT 
(C.7), which equals the tax under the direct subtraction method tax (D.8), which equals the tax 
under the addition method tax (E.11), which, finally, equals the tax collected under a flat tax 
(F.14). 
 
The computation of the tax liability under the personal expenditure tax is not shown in table 1.1 
because it is not derived from P&L accounts but from aggregate recordings of incomings and 
outgoings (savings) by individuals. Nevertheless, given the same base and rate, the tax liability 
under the personal expenditure tax should be the same as under the other consumption taxes.  
1.2.3  Differences between consumption taxes 
Although in theory all consumption taxes are economically equivalent, in practice various 
important differences arise between them. Design and feasibility constraints, and open economy 
aspects have important implications for achieving basic, if sometimes conflicting, tax 
objectives, such as: 
 
•  Fairness in the tax burden distribution; 
•  Neutrality with respect to producer and consumer choices; 
•  Tax revenue allocation to the country of consumption (destination principle); 
•  Minimization of administration and compliance cost; and 
•  Restraining the ability of special interest groups to tinker with the tax base and rate (political 
robustness).  
 
Each of these implications is examined briefly below. 
Fairness 
The retail sales tax, VAT, direct subtraction method tax, and the addition method tax are in rem 
taxes collected at the business level, without regard to the personal circumstances of individual 
consumers, who are assumed to bear the tax. In this context, fairness simply means that all 
goods and services should be taxed alike. The flat tax and, especially, the personal expenditure 
tax, on the other hand, are in personam taxes, primarily collected at the individual level and 
hence equipped to incorporate basic allowances and graduated rates in order to achieve vertical THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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equity goals. In fact, the personal expenditure tax, just like the income tax, can be levied fully in 
accordance with the ability-to-pay principle. 
Neutrality 
 If consumption taxes are not to interfere with producer and consumer choices, the base should 
be defined as comprehensively as possible, while producer goods should not be taxed. As 
shown in real world experience, this is possible under the VAT, but the retail sales tax has 
difficulty reaching services performed by small establishments (there is no tax on purchases that 
can be linked to the tax on sales) and in freeing dual-use goods (which can be used for exempt 
business as well as taxable personal purposes) from tax. Under the VAT, a tax credit will not be 
permitted unless the taxpayer proves to the satisfaction of the tax authorities that the dual-use 
goods have been applied for business purposes.
4 
 
There is no widespread experience with the design and administration of other in rem 
consumption taxes, but since they are accounts-based rather than transactions-based, in practice 
equal treatment of all goods and services may be more difficult to achieve than under the VAT. 
Presumably, the flat tax and the personal expenditure tax should be judged primarily because of 
their effects on the work-leisure choice and the intertemporal consumption choice. All 
consumption taxes are neutral regarding the choice between present and future consumption, 
but they discriminate in favour of leisure, which cannot be taxed. By contrast, an income tax 
distorts both the work-leisure choice and the intertemporal consumption choice. However, since 
the base of the income tax is broader than the base of a consumption tax, the rate of an income 
tax can be set at a relatively lower level to yield the same amount of revenue. This lower rate 
should mitigate distortions whose size tends to increase with the square of the tax rate. 
Accordingly, it is an empirical question whether an income tax or a consumption tax is, on 
balance, more distortionary. 
Destination principle 
 In an open economy, the revenue of the retail sales tax, VAT and the direct subtraction method 
tax is allocated to the country of consumption by applying appropriate border tax adjustments 
(BTAs). Exports are freed of tax, and imports are taxed on par with domestically produced 
goods. In practice, the VAT is better equipped to apply correct BTAs than either the retail sales 
tax or the direct subtraction method tax. The difficulty of freeing dual-use goods from tax under 
the retail sales tax means that the tax enters into export prices, while imports (whose price does 
not include any tax on dual-use goods) tend to be undertaxed compared with similar 
domestically produced goods. Under the direct subtraction method tax, furthermore, there is no 
 
4 This favours the VAT on the plausible assumption that a taxpayer is less likely to cheat the tax authorities under the VAT 
than his suppliers under the retail sales tax. Under the retail sales tax, moreover, a taxpayer has an incentive to treat his 
customer no less favourably (by refusing the exemption) than his competitor might do. For a thorough comparison of the 
VAT and the retail sales tax, see the next paper in this study.      BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAXES 
    23 
presumptively correct documentary evidence (such as VAT invoices) of tax paid in previous 
stages of production and distribution, which hampers the application of unambiguous BTAs.
5  
 
In contrast, the addition method tax, the flat tax and the personal expenditure tax would be 
levied on an origin basis (exports taxed, imports free of tax) or a source basis, to use income tax 
terminology. Generally, this means the primary impact of the tax is on producers, because 
consumers can buy goods at world prices without tax. In economics literature, origin taxation is 
more likely to violate production efficiency than destination taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees, 
1971).
6 The taxation of exports, moreover, would invite transfer pricing issues similar to those 
that bedevil the corporation tax under an arm’s length separate accounting system. 
Administration and compliance costs 
Compliance and tax administration costs should be largely the same under the VAT, the retail 
sales tax and the direct subtraction method tax, but these costs would probably be greater under 
the flat tax and the personal expenditure tax, which are mainly collected at the level of 
individuals. Presumably, the retail sales tax, the direct subtraction method tax and the addition 
method tax are more vulnerable to evasion than the VAT. Administratively, the retail level 
tends to be the weakest link in the production-distribution chain. The account-based nature of 
the direct subtraction method tax and the addition method tax also implies that the tax is not 
shown on invoices. Hence, there is less of an audit trail than under the VAT. Also, sellers and 
buyers do not have opposing interests in the amount of tax that is being charged. The personal 
expenditure tax probably is the most complicated consumption tax, because it requires the 
registration and monitoring of wealth. 
Political robustness 
Politically, the VAT is the most robust consumption tax, primarily because pre-retail firms do 
not benefit from exemptions that make it impossible for them to pass the tax of their suppliers 
on to customers. By contrast, the subtraction method tax, the flat tax and the personal 
expenditure tax, and to a lesser extent the retail sales tax, are vulnerable to erosion through 
political favouritism. Under the direct subtraction method tax, it would be tempting to exempt 
some “worthy” product, sector, or activity. The flat tax and the personal expenditure tax would 
be susceptible to the same politically motivated concessions as the individual income tax.  
 
5 This feature might invite objections from trading partners, who would argue that the direct subtraction method tax is not a 
tax on products per se but rather an accounts-based tax on value added comparable to the business income tax, and hence 
not eligible for export rebate under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
6 See the lucid exposition in Crawford, Keen, and Smith (2010). These authors point out that under the equivalence theorem, 
it is asserted that it does not matter for trade and investment whether goods and services are taxed on a destination or an 
origin basis. Since imports are exchanged for exports, a tax on exports is equivalent to a tax on imports. In practice, 
however, the conditions for the equivalence theorem to hold are so restrictive that it is of little value for policy purposes. 
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1.2.4  VAT: the preferred choice  
The VAT emerges as the consumption tax of choice. A well-designed VAT does not distort 
trade and investment and is highly successful in applying appropriate BTAs. This neutrality 
feature is important for the proper functioning of common markets, such as the EU, and free 
trade areas, such as NAFTA, which do not permit discriminatory taxes on imports or subsidies 
on exports. Beyond that, the VAT is a productive, stable and flexible source of government 
revenue. Since a VAT is collected on a current basis, say, monthly, its revenue generating 
capacity is not affected by inflation and the effect of rate changes on revenue is immediately 
visible. While the VAT scores high on neutrality and feasibility grounds, as an in rem tax it 
cannot be levied on an ability-to-pay basis, but this should be acceptable if adjustments to the 
income tax and social benefit schemes can be made. 
Table 1.2  Workings of the value-added tax 
a. Basic transactions, excluding VAT (in €)     
     
Production distribution chain  Purchases  Sales 
  Producer  0  400 
  Manufacturer  400  1200 
  Wholesaler  1200  1400 
  Retailer  1400  2000 
  Consumer  2000   
     
b. VAT payments to suppliers and by buyers (10% tax in €)     
     
Production distribution chain  VAT paid to supplier  VAT paid by buyer 
  Producer  0  40 
  Manufacturer  40  120 
  Wholesaler  120  140 
  Retailer  140  200 
  Consumer  200   
     
c. Fractional collection of VAT paid by consumer (in €)     
     
Production distribution chain  Tax paid to supplier  Tax paid to government 
  Manufacturer  200   
  Wholesaler  140  60 
  Retailer  120  20 
  Consumer  40  80 
  Producer    40 
 
The VAT’s neutrality deserves to be emphasized. For this purpose, the basic transactions, 
shown in table 1.1, are replicated in table 1.2a. Value added – the difference between sales and 
purchases – is not shown, simply because businesses, unlike authors of textbooks, do not 
compute it. In practice, for any business, the VAT is shown on the invoices that it issues to its 
registered buyers and that it receives from its registered suppliers, while VAT payments to 
suppliers and by buyers are made accordingly, as shown in table 1.2b. Generally, the VAT on 
all purchases made for the purpose of the business is immediately creditable against the tax on     BROAD-BASED CONSUMPTION TAXES 
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(unrelated) sales, or, if there are no sales, any excess credit is eligible for refund without undue 
delay.
7 Consequently, no VAT is collected by government on transactions between registered 
businesses.  
 
But if no net tax is borne by registered businesses in relation to their own value added, why 
does each firm nevertheless remit some tax to the tax authorities? To understand this apparent 
paradox, look upstream at financial flows rather than downstream at the flow of goods and 
services. The answer is then, as shown in table 1.2c, that the consumer pays the full tax that is 
collected, again in full, by the retailer, but which is remitted to the tax authorities by all 
registered businesses in proportion to their share in the total value added embodied in the final 
product. Any net tax remitted by upstream firms is simply paid to them by their successors in 
the production-distribution chain. The only plausible assumption that needs to be made for this 
to occur is that the average length of time for remitting tax and processing any net refunds is the 




It is this feature that has made the VAT such a neutral tax from a business point of view. It 
ensures that the effective rate of tax does not depend on the forms or methods of doing business. 
The rate is the same (and equal to the legal rate) regardless of how many stages a good passes 
through before it reaches the consumer or, for that matter, whether the value is added in earlier 
rather than later stages in the production-distribution process. The VAT is also neutral between 
capital-intensive or labour-intensive modes of production, between the corporate and the non-
corporate form of business, or between home-produced and foreign-made goods.  
 
In sum, the timing of tax collections under the VAT is the same as under a retail sales tax. 
Under both taxes, net tax is collected only when taxable products leave the “ring” of registered 
firms and are sold to final users or consumers (or to small, unregistered firms). So, why not 
impose the tax at retail only? Because retailers are less likely to default on the VAT invoiced to 
them by their suppliers than on the tax they would have had to pay in full to the tax authorities 
if, instead, an equivalent retail sales tax had been imposed. This feature makes the VAT 
particularly robust from a tax collection point of view that is reinforced by requiring sellers to 
state the VAT on invoices. This facilitates the correct and expeditious application of BTAs (the 
VAT shown on the exporter’s purchase invoices is simply refunded) and compliance control 
 
7 In legal terms (as stated unequivocally in Article 167 of the EU’s Council Directive (2006), a taxable business’s right to a 
tax credit (and refund) arises at the same time that the supplier has to account for the tax: the date of both events is based 
on the same VAT invoice date. 
8 To be sure, cash flow benefits (or costs) arise under the VAT (as well as a retail sales tax) if a taxable business's collection 
date (the date at which the tax is collected from customers before being handed over to the tax authorities) does not 
coincide with the remittance date (the date after the collection date but before the latest day designated for handing over the 
tax). For a general treatment of cash flow benefits and costs, see Sandford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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(cross-checking). In other words, the tax leaves a clear audit trail. The invoice method also 
facilitates the calculation of the tax liability: the tax shown on all purchase invoices is simply 
summed and subtracted from the tax shown on all sales invoices. 
1.2.5  Prevalence of consumption taxes 
Not surprisingly, the VAT is the most prevalent form of consumption tax in the world. Some 
150 countries have adopted it, although in practice differences can be large. Viewed globally, 
the advance of the VAT is the most significant development in the field of taxation in the past 
50 years. The march of VAT started in the 1960s in the EU (where the introduction of the 
harmonized VAT is a nonnegotiable condition for membership) and South America, and ended 
in the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries that are now members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, the republics of the former Soviet Union). 
Australia is the latest industrialized country that has converted to VAT. India is set to introduce 
a dual VAT, levied separately at the state as well as the federal level. The spread of the VAT 
owes much to the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, where Michael Keen has been the 
intellectual driving force. 
 
The retail sales tax (RST) is levied by 45 out of 50 U.S. States and the District of Columbia 
(plus some 9,000 local governments), as well as 3 out of 10 Canadian provinces.
9 The retail 
sales taxes in the U.S. are not as broad-based and neutral as most VATs are because they 
exclude most services from the base and widely tax investment goods. The Nordic countries 
and Switzerland also used to levy a retail sales tax, but these countries switched to the VAT 
because it is better equipped to free producer goods of tax and easier to enforce. In the U.S., the 
retail sales tax received support (generally, as a replacement for the income tax) from Sen. 
Richard G. Lugar, R-Ind., former House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer, former 
Reps. Dan Schaefer and Bill Tauzin, and the lobbying group Americans for Fair Taxation. 
 
The direct subtraction method tax used to be levied in Belarus, apparently with little success 
(Bird, 1995). Further, some CIS countries used to impose a tax credit type of VAT through 
producer stages, but taxed distributors on their margins. Although this does not seem to make 
much sense (the difference in function between producers and distributors can hardly be made 
relevant for tax purposes), the explanation should be sought in the way in which businesses 
were taxed under the old turnover tax (Summers and Sunley, 1995). In the U.S., the direct 
subtraction method tax has been pushed by Rep. Sam Gibbons and the lobbying group 
 
9 The Federal Government in Canada levies a VAT, called Goods and Services Tax (GST) as does the province of Québec. 
The Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, and  Nova Scotia, as well as, recently, Ontario and 
British Columbia) have piggybacked the federal VAT in the form of surtaxes. Oil-rich Alberta has neither a retail sales tax nor 
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American Council for Capital Formation. The appeal of this tax lies in its resemblance to a 
business tax, which may enhance its acceptability to consumers. 
 
The flat tax has been proposed by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka (1985, 1995). It has 
received much attention in the U.S. because its wage component resembles a progressive 
income tax through the application of a basic exemption. As a result, it mitigates the 
regressivity of a consumption tax for lower-income groups. What the flat tax cannot do, of 
course, is make the tax burden distribution more progressive for higher-income groups who 
receive capital income. In the U.S., legislation for a flat tax has been tabled by former House 
Majority Leader Richard K. Armey and Sens. Richard C. Shelby, R-Ala., and Arlen Specter, D-
Pa. 
 
The addition method tax is used in some countries to tax the value added by financial 
institutions, which is difficult to compute under a tax credit invoice VAT, because the 
intermediation charge that should be taxed is embedded in the interest, premium, or return, 
which should not be taxed. Israel, Argentina, and France have experience with the addition 
method tax. Italy administers a direct addition method tax, called IRAP, at the regional level. It 
is not a destination-based VAT, however, because the tax is not refunded at export or levied at 
import. 
 
India and Sri Lanka used to levy a non-cash flow type of personal expenditure tax in the 1950s, 
but abandoned it after a few years because the tax proved difficult to administer properly. 
Subsequently, the feasibility of the expenditure tax has greatly improved following the 
pioneering work of an able lawyer, William Andrews (1974), and in his wake the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (1977) and the Meade Committee (1978). Andrews showed that 
annual taxable consumption expenditures can be computed on an aggregate cash flow basis as 
the difference between incomings and savings rather than by having to add up all individual 
expenditures made during the year. In the U.S., the expenditure tax, called Unlimited Savings 
Allowance Tax (USA) tax, has been tabled by the Strengthening of America Commission under 
the leadership of former Sens Sam Nunn and Pete V. Domenici, who proposed that it be 
combined with a direct subtraction method tax at the business level (Seidman, 1997). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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1.3  Lawyers, economists, and accountants 
This section discusses the views of the legal, economic, and accounting professions on the 
VAT. There is much to learn from the opinions, which emphasize different aspects of the tax. 
1.3.1  The rigor of lawyers 
 
VAT law design 
Lawyers are indispensable in making the VAT operationally possible. Unambiguous legislation 
is essential if a VAT is to be effectively implemented. Under any tax, but particularly a tax that 
is based on voluntary compliance, clear definitions are required of who should be taxed, on 
what, where, when, and to what extent. In legal jargon, the terms, “taxable person,” “taxable 




Taxable persons, who must apply for registration, are liable to tax for all amounts received or 
receivable by them for taxable supplies made in the course of a business, trade, or similar 
activity. Persons, natural and legal, are considered taxable persons only if they make taxable 
supplies independently. This excludes employees and agents acting for and on behalf of a 
principal from the taxable persons category. Only taxable persons can issue VAT invoices, 
which entitle buyers of taxable supplies to a credit for the tax shown on the invoice. In addition, 
they must keep prescribed records of their economic activities, which serve as the basis for 
verifying whether or not they have met their obligations. 
 
The VAT is imposed on “supplies of goods and services,” meaning all economic activity unless 
specifically exempted. A supply of goods is defined as “the transfer of the right to dispose of 
tangible property as owner,” a civil law concept. Generally, tangible property includes 
“electricity, gas, heat, refrigeration, and the like.” Services, tangible as well as intangible, are 
defined in catch-all fashion as “any transaction that does not constitute a supply of goods,” 
including “obligations to refrain from an act or to tolerate an act or situation.” To be taxable, 
supplies must be made against consideration, called the “taxable value,” which includes all 
forms of payment received by the supplier, in cash or in kind, whenever and however paid, 
regardless of who pays them. Gifts are not taxable, but non-business use of a supply, e.g. for 
personal or employee consumption, is taxable if provided free of charge. Exceptionally, arm’s 
length prices may be substituted for actual realized values, for example if the parties to a 
transaction are the same or related. 
 
 
10 For an excellent summary treatment of the legal issues, see Williams (1996).     LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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When it has been determined that a supply of goods and services has taken place, it is important 
to ascertain the place and time of the supply. The charge to VAT extends only to goods and 
services supplied within a particular taxing jurisdiction or imported into that jurisdiction. 
Supplies of goods are located where the goods are delivered, made available, or handed over, 
except if goods are to be assembled or installed, in which case the place of supply is the place 
where the goods are assembled or installed. Since services cannot be the subject of physical 
observation and control, some other definition of the place of supply is needed. Under the EU’s 
new rules the place of supply for business-to-business (B2B) services is the place where the 
recipient of the services has his business, while business-to-consumer (B2C) services are taxed 
at the place of the provider of the services.
11 
 
Furthermore, the timing of the supply is important for deciding when a VAT invoice has to be 
issued. This in turn determines the tax period in which the VAT is due regarding the supply. As 
a rule, the time of supply occurs when an invoice is issued, generally within a week of the time 
when goods are delivered, made available, transported or paid for – whichever event occurs 
earlier. The time of supply of services occurs when the services are rendered. Generally, input 
tax credits follow these timing of supply rules. Apportionment rules are in place for those cases 
when taxable persons make exempt as well as taxable supplies, or when they make personal use 
of business assets. No input tax credit is allowed for a number of goods and services which 
although used in the course of taxable activities are indistinguishable from goods and services 
bought by consumers. Examples are personal or living expenses, employee benefits, 
recreational equipment and facilities, and passenger vehicles. 
The VAT as a transactions tax 
As implied by this very brief description of VAT rules, the legal profession is quite adamant 
about viewing the VAT as a tax on transactions by registered entities against consideration. 
Lawyers also maintain that the VAT is a tax on consumption expenditures rather than on, more 
broadly, consumption activities. Moreover, they assert that the VAT is a tax on current 
consumption – on all goods and services that leave the ring of registered entities, regardless of 
whether they are consumed immediately or embody a stock of services that are consumed over 
the lifetime of the asset (for example, residential housing, cars, household appliances, and 
furniture).  
 
This contrasts with the view held by economists that, ideally, the VAT should tax all 
consumption activities, including self-produced items of consumption, such as meals, because 
this would ensure equal treatment with other products bought in the marketplace. Lawyers 
would not consider this a taxable event, although they would tax, say, vegetables withdrawn 
 
11 Both rules are subject to major overriding exceptions concerning, among others, services to immovable property (taxed 
where the property is situated), cultural and educational services, and restaurants (taxed where actually performed), 
transportation (taxed proportionate to distance), and vehicle rentals (taxed where provided). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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from business stock for personal use by the greengrocer as a taxable self-supply on the 
argument that the vegetables are produced in a business context, not in a personal capacity. 
Accordingly the greengrocer’s home-grown carrots used for personal consumption (and not 
sold to customers) would not be subject to VAT. Economists would like to tax both events. 
 
Furthermore, economists maintain that the VAT is a tax on flows rather than stocks. In other 
words, ideally, the home-owner should be taxed periodically on the rental value of his property, 
just as the tenant should be taxed on the rent invoiced by the landlord. However, lawyers would 
argue that residential property should be taxed when the house is transferred from the taxable 
builder to the exempt owner-occupier. This follows from the legislator’s point of view that 
owner-occupiers should not be registered for VAT purposes. Lawyers point out that the in rem 
nature of the VAT does not support the position that durable consumer goods should be treated 
differently from nondurable goods. As a transactions-based tax, VAT should be imposed when 
the title to a durable consumer good passes on to the exempt consumer.
12 
 
Finally, the tendency of lawyers to accept the legislator’s product as given means that they tend 
to pay notably less attention to the distortions caused by the VAT than do economists. These 
distortions, which are a cost to society over and above the revenue yield of the VAT, result 
mainly from exemptions and, to a lesser extent, from rate differentiations. Exemptions distort 
input choices (for example, outsourcing) and harm exports. Rate differentiations interfere with 
consumer preferences and hence producer choices. 
1.3.2  The insight of economists 
Economists are good in analyzing the nature of a consumption tax.
13 This can be done on the 
basis of a simple equation showing the identity between the sources (wages and capital income) 
and the uses of income (consumption and savings) in a household budget or a country’s national 
accounts. The following identity shows the relationship between the two sides of the budget for 
a closed economy and abstracting from government operations. 
 
Y ≡ W + R ≡ C + S (≡ I)                            (1) 
or 
C ≡ Y – S ≡ W + R – I                  (2) 
 
 
12 Both views result in the same tax liability when the VAT on the value of newly created residential property is viewed, as it 
should be, as the tax on the present discounted value of the future dwelling services of the property. This implies, of course, 
that increases or decreases in the value of the dwelling services, reflected in changes in the value of the property, are not 
included in the tax base. For a more detailed treatment of the differences between an economist’s and a lawyer’s point of 
view of VAT (illustrated by the treatment of real estate), see Cnossen (1996).  
13 For a useful treatment, see Auerbach (1997).      LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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Y is total income composed of labour income W and capital income R, C is consumption, and S 
is savings (which equals I, that is, investment). R is the sum of the risk-free or normal return on 
capital (in other words, its opportunity cost), entrepreneurial rewards for risk-taking (which can 
also be considered as labour income), and economic rents. In sum, R represents business profits, 
conventionally computed. The opportunity cost of capital is also called the hurdle rate of return. 
At the margin, it equals the rate of return on a riskless project. Accordingly, it can be likened to 
the inflation-adjusted, risk-free world rate of interest. A business will go on investing up to the 
point at which the expected rate of return on the project just equals the discount rate, which is 
the opportunity cost of capital. 
 
Each of the three terms in identity (2) can serve as the base for a particular consumption tax. 
Basically, the retail sales tax has C as its base. The retail sales tax is paid by consumers to 
businesses selling at retail, who remit the tax to the government. Similarly, the personal 
expenditure tax can be identified with a tax on Y – S levied at the individual level. It resembles 
the current tax on wage income, which permits a deduction for pension contributions, but taxes 
the contributions plus accumulated capital income on later payout, while the income net of the 
pension contribution is currently consumed.  
 
The term W + R – I, representing value added, forms the base for the other forms of 
consumption tax. It is readily apparent that at the business level this value added is equivalent to 
the difference between sales and purchases in the P&L account, but calculated on a cash flow 
basis.
14 In other words, investments (including inventories) are expensed immediately; the tax is 
fully creditable against the tax on sales, to use VAT terminology. This contrasts with the 
income tax's matching principle under which the cost of investments is expensed over their 
economic life; hence, the normal return on capital is taxed. 
 
As stated above, value added is taxed directly under the direct subtraction method tax, while it 
is taxed indirectly under the VAT. Under the flat tax, wages (W) are also deducted from value 
added (as calculated under the direct subtraction method) and subsequently taxed at the level of 
individual earners. The remaining tax base, that is, R – I (appropriately called business cash 
flow rather than capital income), is taxed at the business level. An important question under the 
flat tax is what to do with pension contributions: tax them as wages and exempt payouts 
(prepayment method) or exclude them from wage income and tax later payouts along with the 
capital income accumulated in pension funds (standard method). The flat tax, as proposed in the 
U.S., follows the standard method. In principle, the present discounted value of the tax liability 




14 Cash-flow accounting should not be confused with cash basis accounting. In contrast to cash basis accounting, cash-flow 
accounting is accrual based. 
15 For the equivalence and the conditions under which it holds, see US Department of the Treasury (1977). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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The taxation of business cash flow distinguishes a consumption tax from a wage tax, which 
taxes W only. The two are equal if R – I is zero, which it is in a fully competitive market in 
which there are no economic rents to be earned. These rents can be associated with, for 
instance, head starts, such as a favourable location, a well-known brand name, or a new 
technique or product. Furthermore, investment (I) may be taken to represent the present value of 
the services rendered by new business assets discounted at the normal rate of return on capital. 
Therefore, R – I represents the inframarginal return on old business assets. On the introduction 
(or increase) of a consumption tax, this tax is capitalized in the form of a lower value of the old 
assets suffered by the owners. For this reason, economists often refer to the VAT as a tax on 
wages plus old capital.  
 
This discussion shows that the only difference between a consumption tax and an income tax 
concerns the tax treatment of the normal risk-free return on capital, which is exempt under a 
consumption tax but taxed under an income tax. It follows that a VAT can be converted into an 
income tax by disallowing an immediate credit for the tax on investment goods against the tax 
on sales, but permitting this credit to be spread over the economic life of investment goods. By 
the same token, an income tax can be converted into a VAT by taxing wages plus business 




Although their insights are most illuminating in understanding the nature of the VAT, 
economists tend to be dismissive of the legal requirements for a good tax, which are essential 
for tax certainty. VAT practice, which has to be rooted in civil and commercial usage, is often 
more obstinate than economists realize or are willing to admit.  
1.3.3  The precision of accountants 
Accountants rightly believe that the VAT and other consumption taxes are best understood by 
working through the computations that are required to ascertain their bases and liabilities from 
the P&L accounts of taxable business firms. Moreover, this makes it possible to compare the 
consumption tax base directly with the base of the business income tax, which is also derived 
from the P&L account. 
VAT and the profit & loss account 
The P&L account is the central summary statement of a business firm’s activities. Consider the 
stylized example in table 1.3, which shows the P&L account of a EU trading firm (re-arranged 
to aid the understanding of the subsequent computations) as well as the items that enter into the 
VAT base and the corresponding gross and net tax liabilities.  
 
16 For an interesting legal analysis showing the link between an income tax and a consumption tax, see Slemrod (1997).     LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
    33 
Table 1.3  VAT and the profit & loss (P&L) account (in €, excluding 10 percent VAT) 
 
Costs  P&L  
Account 
VAT    Proceeds  P&L 
Account 
VAT   
    Base  Tax      Base  Tax 
               
A. Purchases  800  1.100  110     B. Sales  1.900  1.900  190 
         Goods  950  950  95       Goods  1.600  1.600  160 
         Services       50      50     5          Services  300  300  30 
         Inventory - open: 150 
                            close: 350 
 
  – 200 
 
      - 
 
   - 
     
         Machinery         -     100   10       
         (depreciation - 4 yrs)           
           
C. Factor rewards  1.300  -  -  D. Inv. income  200  -  - 
         Wages  450  -  -           Dividends   125  -  - 
         Depreciation  25  -  -           Interest  75  -  - 
         Interest paid  35  -  -       
         Net profits  790  -  -       
           
E. Totals (A + C; B + D)  2.100        2.100   
           
F. Value added and tax (B - A)     800  80       
 
The business sells goods and services that it produces by adding the value of the services of its 
labour and capital (understood as business cash flow, as defined above) to its purchases from 
other firms. The left side of the table, under A, shows the firm’s purchases of goods and 
services, including a piece of machinery, which is depreciated over four years. Also, opening 
and closing inventories are shown; €200 has been added to inventory in the reporting period. 
The right side of the table, under B, shows the firm’s sales of goods and services. Furthermore, 
C, factor rewards, gives details of the value added by the firm’s labour and capital in the form 
of wages, depreciation, interest paid and net profits earned. Also, the firm has some stocks and 
bonds on which it earns investment income, which is shown under D.  
 
The VAT computations are shown in the top of the table under A and B. VAT is charged at a 
rate of 10 percent on sales of goods and services, and a credit is permitted for the VAT on 
purchases. Accordingly, the net VAT liability is €80 (line F).  
 
Clearly, the entries for purchases in the conventional P&L account cannot be used directly to 
ascertain taxable value added. The reason is obvious. Although the P&L account and the VAT 
both record the transactions on an accrual basis, the VAT is also levied on a cash-flow basis of 
accounting. Thus, no correction needs to be made for the change in the value of inventory, 
which must be made in the P&L account to match sales and purchases in the reporting period 
for business income or commercial purposes. Further, the cash flow basis of accounting implies 
that the tax on the purchase of machinery is credited immediately against the VAT on sales. 
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Note that the VAT does not enter the P&L account; it is not a cost to business. VAT would be 
included in the value of purchases shown in the P&L account if the purchases were exempt, yet 
VAT had been levied on the inputs used in producing the purchases. Of course, VAT may 
appear on the balance sheet under accounts payable or receivable.  
Comparing consumption taxes 
The figures in the P&L account (table 1.3) can also be used to compute the tax liabilities of 
other consumption taxes (and the business income tax), except the personal expenditure tax. For 
this purpose, the figures are regrouped in table 1.4. Cash flow accounting is applied to inventory 
and machine purchases, but the matching principle is applied to the calculation of the base and 
the liability of the conventional business income tax. The top of the table shows the tax base 
calculations, the bottom the computation of the tax liabilities. 
 
The calculation of value added under the VAT, the direct subtraction method tax and the flat tax 
can be performed without much ado, but the calculation is less straightforward under the 
addition method tax. Wages are shown on a cash flow basis, but rents (inframarginal profits) 
must be ascertained by starting with taxable profits for business income tax purposes (that is, 
€790 EUR, line 13), subtracting investment income (€200, line 11; this is not value added by 
the firm), the purchase of machinery (€100, line 9) and the addition to inventory (€200, line 8), 
and by adding interest paid (€35, line 7) and depreciation (€35, line 6). Accordingly, rents total 
€350, which is added to wages (that is, €450) to obtain taxable value added of €800 (line 12). 
 
The calculation of the retail sales tax is not shown in table 1.4. It would be imposed on sales 
(€1.900 in table 1.3) at a rate of 10 percent, so the tax liability would be €190. This amount is 
the same as the sum of the net VAT liability in table 1.4, that is, €80 (€190 VAT on sales minus 
€110 VAT on purchases)) plus the VAT on purchases, that is, €110, which, under VAT, is paid 
by the firm to its suppliers, who remit this amount to the government in proportion to their own 
value added. 
 
The calculations in table 1.4, like the earlier accounting identities, establish that the four in rem 
consumption taxes and the flat tax are economically identical given the same base and rate. 
And, as noted above, this holds true for the personal expenditure tax. 
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Table 1.4  Computation of consumption tax and business income tax liabilities (In €, excluding 10% VAT) 
P&L Account  Consumption taxes                                                 Business income taxes    
















             
Tax bases             
  1. Sales  1.900  1.900  1.900    1.900  1.900 
  2. Purchases  – 1.100  – 1.100  – 1.100    – 800            – 1.100 
  3. Value added / gross profits             = 800  = 800  = 800    = 1.100  = 800 
  4. Wages      –  450        + 450  – 450  – 450 
  5. Rents / cash flow      = 350       = 650  = 350 
  6. Depreciation              + 25  – 25   
  7. Interest paid              + 35  – 35   
  8. Inventory change        – 200     
  9. Purchase of machinery        – 100     
10. Operating profits        + 590  = 590   
11. Investment income          + 200   
12. Taxable value added  800  800  800  800     
13. Taxable profits / cash flow          790  350 
             
Tax liabilities             
A.  VAT  80           
      a. VAT on sales (10% of 1)  190           
      b. VAT on purchases (10% of 2)   – 110           
B.  Direct subtraction method tax  
     (10% of 3) 
  80         
C.  Flat tax       80       
      a. Tax on wages (10% of 4)      45       
      b. Tax on rents (10% of 5)      35       
D.  Addition method tax (10% of 12)        80     
E.  Business income tax (10% of 13)          79   
F.  Cash flow business income tax 
     (10% of 13) 
          35 
 
Business income taxes 
For comparison purposes, table 1.4 also shows the computation of the tax liabilities of two 
kinds of business income tax:  
 
•  A conventional business income tax, under which purchases are related to sales in the same 
reporting period (matching principle) and machinery is depreciated over a four-year period; and 
•  A cash flow business income tax, which allows the immediate expensing of inventory additions 
and machinery, but which does not allow a deduction for interest.
17 
 
17 It should be noted that the cash flow variant is equivalent to a business income tax, conventionally computed, which 
permits a deduction from profits of the normal return on equity (equal to the inflation-adjusted world rate of interest) and 
which does not tax this return at shareholder level (nor the deductible interest on debt at debtholder level). This variant goes 
by the name of allowance for corporate equity (ACE) (Institute for Fiscal Studies (1991). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT PRIMER FOR LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND ACCOUNTANTS 
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The application of the matching principle implies that a conventional business income tax 
includes the normal return on capital as well as rents (inframarginal profits) in its base. By 
contrast, a cash flow business income tax excludes the opportunity cost of capital from its base 
by allowing immediate expensing. In other words, its tax base consists of inframarginal profits. 
Not surprisingly, the base of a cash flow business income tax is the same as the item ‘rents’ in 
the base of the flat tax, that is, €350. Accordingly, the return on marginal investments, the 
hurdle rate of return, is not affected by a consumption tax. Other things being equal, this should 
promote saving and investment compared with an income tax. 
 
Finally, the calculation of the various consumption and business income tax liabilities from the 
P&L account clearly indicates that all of these taxes are basically identical for tax compliance 
purposes. The VAT, like the business income tax, is an accounts-controlled tax. Accordingly, 
there is little difference between a VAT audit and a business income tax audit. This implies that 
these taxes should be administered by the same tax organization. VAT registration, return and 
payment processing activities could be placed in a separate department, but VAT audits should 
be performed jointly with income tax audits. Also, tax enforcement procedures should be 
closely linked to similar procedures for income tax purposes. 
1.4  Lessons from world-wide experience 
This paper has shown that a discussion of various alternative consumption taxes sheds light on 
the nature of VAT. Economically, the VAT is equivalent to a retail sales tax even with respect 
to the timing of tax collections. VAT is the preferred form of consumption tax, however, 
because it is collected piecemeal throughout the production-distribution process, does not 
interfere with the forms and methods of doing business, unambiguously relieves exports of tax, 
is politically robust, least vulnerable to evasion and avoidance, and relatively easy to understand 
for the business community. By not taxing the normal return on capital, VAT does not affect the 
hurdle rate of return on investment. 
 
With VAT, the eye should be on the ball, and the ball is revenue. As an in rem tax, VAT can 
not be used to achieve vertical equity goals. Its main objective is to raise revenue as neutrally as 
possible. This requires the broadest possible base and a single rate. In this respect, the European 
VATs leave much to be desired (Cnossen, 2003). The EU pioneered the VAT and mistakenly 
tried to align its burden distribution as closely as possible to the old turnover taxes, although all 
member states had other more sophisticated instruments in place, such as income taxes and 
social benefit schemes, to manipulate overall tax and government expenditure distribution 
patterns.  
 
With VAT, it is crucial to get it right from the start (Keen, 2009). Deviations from the 
undisputable requirements of a modern VAT are nearly impossible to undo once the tax has     LESSONS FROM WORLD-WIDE EXPERIENCE 
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been introduced. Basically, the following lessons can be learned from the experience in new 
VAT countries, such as New Zealand, Singapore, and South Africa, and, to a lesser extent, 
Australia and Canada (which have unnecessarily muddled up the VAT rate structure). 
 
•  Limit exemptions to those dictated by strict administrative cost benefit considerations. 
Exemptions violate the logic and functionality of the VAT. They distort input choices and harm 
exports. Accordingly, most health, education, government, cultural and financial services 
should be brought into the VAT base.
18 Exemptions should be confined to elementary education 
and the sale of used residential housing.  
•  Levy the VAT at a single rate and do not impose a zero rate on so-called basic necessities, such 
as groceries. A zero rate on food is not a well targeted instrument to alleviate the VAT burden 
on the poor. In absolute terms, the benefit of a zero rate accrues mainly to middle- and higher-
income consumers who buy more expensive varieties of food, eat out more often, and throw 
food away more easily.
19 Consequently, the concessionary treatment of food tends to give twice 
as much relief to higher-income groups than to low-income groups, an odd way of alleviating 
the plight of the poor. The zero rate should be confined to exports. 
•  Provide for a high threshold of at least €100,000 so that small businesses and farmers do not 
have to register and pay VAT, saving on administration and compliance costs. Of course, small 
entities would still pay VAT on inputs purchased from taxable businesses, implying that only a 
part of the potential revenue would be foregone.
20 At the same time, optional registration should 




18 Surprisingly, the OECD calls these “standard exemptions,” although they do not meet basic standards of rationality or 
functionality (OECD, 2008). 
19 For these and other reasons why an industrialized country should levy the VAT at a single rate, see Cnossen (1999). 
20 Based on an earlier publication (Cnossen, 1994), Cnossen (2002) calculated that in the U.S. a $100,000 exemption would 
reduce the number of potential registrants (25 million at that time) to approximately 9 million (including 5 million voluntary 
registrants) – less than the registrants under a national retail sales tax. The exempt registrants would account for 2.6 percent 
of aggregate gross receipts. In other words, if their value added would be one-third of gross receipts and the VAT rate would 
be 10 percent, the revenue foregone would be less than 0.1 of gross receipts. THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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2  VAT coordination in common markets and federations: 
Lessons from the European experience
21 
2.1  Introduction 
Against the background of an analysis of the choice between a VAT and an RST as the best broad-based 
consumption tax to deal with goods and services entering cross-border trade, this study examines the 
phenomenon of carousel fraud in the European Union. Although carousel fraud is by no means as 
important as shadow economy fraud and contrived insolvency fraud, it receives much attention. Various 
proposals have been made to deal with carousel fraud, principally by subjecting exports to VAT and giving 
an equivalent tax credit to importers. At the same time, exporting member states would pay the VAT 
collected by them to importing countries, which would restore the destination principle. This study argues 
that it is not the break in the VAT collection chain that is at the root of the problem, but the break in the 
VAT audit trail, which proscribes the reach of each state’s VAT monitoring powers. Accordingly, cross-
border audits are indicated, followed up by investigations and prosecutions, if necessary. The taxation of 
exports would simply shift fraudulent practices to the import stage through the use of false invoices. The 
German and Austrian proposal for converting the VAT into an RST is found wanting. 
There is wide agreement that a broad-based consumption tax should be levied either in the form 
of a retail sales tax (RST) or a value-added tax (VAT). In theory, an RST and a VAT are both 
comprehensive, destination-based forms of consumption tax that take domestic consumer 
expenditures, not producer goods, as their base, and that cover the retail stage, either by 
definition (RST) or by design (VAT). An RST excludes producer goods through the suspension 
technique, while a VAT achieves this objective through the tax-credit invoice method. Both 
taxes include imports in the base but free exports of tax. Given equal coverage and tax rates, an 
RST and a VAT are identical, therefore, in their economic effects and in the distribution of their 
respective tax burdens. In principle, the only difference between the two taxes is the way in 
which the tax is collected by the tax authorities – in full from retailers under an RST and 
fractionally throughout the production-distribution process under a VAT.
22  
 
Important questions remain, however, about the feasibility of either tax at the state or provincial 
level in a common market or federation. To implement the destination principle (that is, to 
 
21 This paper was presented at two conferences organized by the American Tax Policy Institute, held September 14, 2008, 
and February 18-19, 2009, and subsequently published in Tax Law Review (Cnossen, 2010a). The author is grateful to 
Charles McLure for closely reviewing this paper and to Richard Bird, Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Bernd Genser and Walter 
Hellerstein for helpful comments on an earlier version. 
22 It should be emphasized that this does not effect the timing of tax payments to the government, which is the same under 
an RST and a VAT. Net VAT is collected only after the consumer (or non-registered trader) has been invoiced for the full 
amount of tax on his purchases, and it is this amount that is subsequently collected throughout the production-distribution 
process. In other words (just as under an RST), no net VAT is collected within the ring of registered firms, provided, quite 
plausibly, that the average length of time required for remitting tax and for processing any refunds is the same as the 
average length of time required for settling accounts receivable and payable. See Cnossen (1987). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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effect taxation in the jurisdiction of consumption), it must be possible to apply and administer 
correct border tax adjustments (BTAs). How can (sub)national governments ensure that imports 
into their jurisdiction are included in the consumption tax base and that exports leave their 
jurisdiction free of tax? Since an RST seems inherently destination-based, is it in this respect 
superior to a VAT in taxing consumers and consumers only? Does the application of BTAs 
under state VATs depend on an overarching tax or coordination mechanism at the central or 
federal level? These questions are pertinent in a common market, such as the European Union 
(EU), but also in the United States (U.S.) where the debate on the most appropriate form of 
consumption tax – at both federal and state level – seems to be gaining momentum. If a federal 
VAT was adopted, could the states follow suit if they decided to convert their RSTs into VATs? 
More pertinently, can states introduce a VAT in the absence of a federal VAT?  
 
The experience of state VATs in a borderless EU can be helpful in answering these questions. 
As background, the paper starts with a review in section 2.2 of the consumption taxes that are 
actually levied in the G-7 countries and the reasons that led various countries to prefer a VAT 
over an RST. In practice, an RST seems less effective than a VAT in confining the base to 
consumer goods and services and in effecting correct BTAs. A VAT emerges as the preferred 
form of broad-based consumption tax, but a VAT imposes tax throughout the entire production-
distribution process and therefore requires explicit BTAs for goods as well as services. Prior-
stage VAT has to be refunded to exporters and VAT has to be applied to imports from other 
taxing jurisdictions. Currently, in the EU, these BTAs, described in section 2.3, are affected 
through the accounts of exporters and importers.  
 
The EU BTA arrangements are susceptible to fraud. VAT may not be paid at import (or a credit 
may be claimed for nonexistent imports) and refund claims may be filed for nonexistent exports 
(or goods may not actually be exported). Most attention is given to so-called carousel fraud, 
under which an importer charges VAT to his customer on goods or services bought VAT-free in 
another member state, but subsequently disappears without paying the VAT over to the tax 
authorities. His customer can take credit for the VAT, however, and even a refund if he 
subsequently exports the goods bought from the importer. VAT would be refunded without 
having been paid in previous stages of production or distribution. Section 2.4 examines the 
nature and extent of this type of fraud and other malpractices in the EU.  
 
The European Commission and various authors have argued that intra-EU VAT fraud can be 
prevented by charging VAT on exporters in exporting states and remitting the proceeds to 
importing states to finance the VAT credits permitted to importers. This would repair the so-
called break in the VAT-collection chain at internal EU borders, but maintain the revenue 
allocation under the destination principle. The proposals go by the name of “exporter rating” 
and are evaluated in section 2.5. Under another proposal, recently put forward by Germany and 
Austria, and reviewed in section 2.6, carousel fraud would be defined away by putting the     EXPERIENCE WITH RSTS AND VATS 
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liability for the VAT on buyers of goods and services rather than sellers. Reverse charging 
throughout the entire production-distribution process would transform a VAT into an RST. In 
effect, reverse charging would imply that no net VAT would be collected in any pre-retail stage 
of production or distribution. 
 
Finally, section 2.7 summarizes the evaluation of current and proposed BTA arrangements in 
the EU. For the time being, the current setup is preferred. Exporter rating would simply shift 
VAT fraud from the export stage to the import stage. Actually, it is not the break in the VAT 
collection chain which matters to enforcement but the break in the VAT audit trail. This audit 
trail should be extended across EU borders, similar to the cross-border extension of states’ 
police and judicial powers. In the U.S., it would be possible, of course, to charge the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) with monitoring the audit trail of state VATs. The paper concludes, 
therefore, that state VATs are feasible in the U.S., with or without a federal VAT.  
2.2  Experience with RSTs and VATs 
There is ample experience with RSTs and VATs at national and sub-national levels of 
government. Of particular interest for the U.S. debate are the reasons that countries have 
advanced in choosing VAT over RST, particularly as they affect interstate (and international) 
trade. 
2.2.1  G-7 countries 
Table 2.1 lists the consumption taxes that are levied in the G-7 countries: (a) by the U.S. and 
Canada – members of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) along with Mexico, 
(b) by France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom – four of the 27 member states of the 
EU (together accounting for nearly 80 percent of the EU's total gross product), and (c) by Japan, 
the fourth largest trading partner of the U.S. At the national level, the EU member states, Japan 
and Canada impose VATs. At the sub-national level, RSTs are found in the U.S. and Canada, 
while the province of Québec has a VAT. 
 
In the U.S., an RST is levied by 45 out of 50 States
23, accounting for on average 31.8 percent of 
total state tax revenue (including RST-revenue collected by local governments), or 7.8 percent 
of total national tax revenue (2.2 percent of GDP) (OECD, 2008a). The coverage of the various 
RSTs differs widely across states and is far from comprehensive. Most states, for instance, do  
 
23 In addition, the District of Columbia levies an RST, as do some 9000 local governments, including counties, cities, school 
boards, and police departments. Local government RSTs are mostly piggy-backed on state RSTs. For a comprehensive 
treatment, see Due and Mikesell (1994) and for up-to-date information, Duncan (2010). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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Table 2.1  G-7 Countries: Consumption Taxes in 2010 
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Sources: Type of consumption tax and rates – U.S.: Duncan (2010); Canada: Bird and Gendron (2010); EU: European Commission 
(2010); Japan: International VAT Services (available on the internet). 
 
a 
RST = Retail Sales Tax; VAT = Value-Added Tax, called Goods and Services Tax (GST) in Canada, Québec Sales Tax (QST) in 
Québec, and Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) in the Atlantic provinces, British Colombia, and Ontario. 
b 
As percentage of the tax-exclusive value of taxable goods and services. The zero rate universally applicable to interprovincial and 
interstate exports is not shown. 
c
 The letter "X" means that essential products (mainly food items) are exempted. In addition to the lower rates shown in the table, France, 
Italy, and the UK levy special lower rates of 2.1 percent, 4 percent, and 5 percent, respectively. These rates, however, are only applicable 
to one or two products. In France, special, generally lower rates are levied in Corsica. 
d 
Revenue figures, drawn from OECD (2008a), relate to 2006 and are for all levels of government. 
e
 Inclusive of (highest) local RST rates. 
f 
Inclusive of the special 1 percent local consumption tax that is levied on the same base and collected along with the VAT. 
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not tax services, apart from the rental of tangible personal property, transient accommodation, 
and (selected) utility services.
24 Furthermore, while all states tax food consumed outside the 
home, less than half of all states tax food purchased for home consumption. Nearly all states 
exempt prescription drugs and several exempt clothing and footwear. Beyond that, all states 
include various producer goods in the tax base, which distorts the choice of production 
technique. Thus, one-half of all states explicitly taxes industrial and agricultural machinery. 
Furthermore, nearly all states tax various dual-use goods and services, such as building 
materials, utility services, computers, small transport vehicles, office equipment, stationery, and 
various other items that can be used for business as well as private purposes. Again, this distorts 
producer choices. 
 
In Canada, an RST is levied by three out of ten provinces. The provincial RSTs resemble those 
levied by the U.S. states, although the tax base generally is somewhat broader. Interestingly, the 
province of Québec imposes its own VAT, basically on the same base as the federal VAT 
(GST).
25 The Canadian VAT resembles the EU VAT, although the rate of 5 percent is much 
lower than the average standard rate of 19.5 percent in the EU.
26 Noteworthy features of the 
Canadian VAT are the zero rating of basic groceries and prescription drugs, the partial rebates 
of VAT on purchases of inexpensive new homes and on purchases by the MUSH sector 
(municipalities, universities, schools, hospitals – recently renamed the MASH sector to reflect 
substitution of academic for universities) which is exempt in the EU, and VAT refunds for 
lower-income groups (presumptively established amounts based on previous year's incomes). 
 
In the EU, all 27 member states – not just the four states listed in the table – levy VAT, because 
its adoption is a condition for membership.
27 The VATs in the EU are much more 
comprehensive than the RSTs in the U.S. Whereas the RST-bases cover on average 35 percent 
of total consumption expenditures, the harmonized EU VAT-base covers on average 67 
 
24 Only Hawaii, New Mexico, South Dakota, and West Virginia tax 100 services or more of 168 enumerated services (Tax 
Administrators News, 2005). Of course, all states with RST tax the value of distribution activities, such as wholesaling and 
retailing, carried on in the normal course of selling goods and included in the price of the goods. Also, the value of many 
services, although not taxed explicitly, is taxed indirectly if rendered to businesses that use the services to produce taxable 
goods. 
25 For a useful account of coordinating the Québec VAT with the federal VAT, see Bird and Gendron (2010). Oil-rich Alberta 
is the only Canadian province that levies neither RST nor VAT. This is also the situation in the three northern territories: 
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Yukon. 
26 Of course, the provincial GST or RST rates have to be added for the comparison. In Québec, for instance, this results in a 
combined rate of 12.88 percent, because the federal VAT of 5 percent is levied on prices inclusive of the provincial VAT of 
7.5 percent. The HST rate in the Atlantic provinces,  British Columbia and Ontario, on the other hand, is levied jointly with 
the federal GST, while revenues are allocated to the provinces on the basis of consumption statistics. 
27 The VATs of the EU member states have been harmonized under the Sixth Directive on Value Added Tax agreed to by 
the Council of the European Economic Community in 1977. For an updated and consolidated version, see Council Directive 
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percent.
28 In principle, all services are taxed. Exemptions are limited to services provided in the 
public interest (health care, education, social services) and services that are too difficult to tax 
for administrative reasons (tenant-paid rents and imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, 
insurance and banking). Food products are also taxed, often at lower-than-standard rates 
(exceptions are the UK and Ireland, which tax food purchased for home consumption at a zero 
rate). The tax-credit invoice system comprehensively eliminates the tax on producer goods. As 
indicated in table 2.1, VAT rates in the EU are higher than RST rates in the U.S. In conjunction 
with the much broader base, this means that VAT collections in the EU, as a percentage of 
GDP, are on average more than three-and-a-half times higher than RST collections in the U.S. 
 
The base of the Japanese VAT is also similar to that of the EU VAT, but the rate of 5 percent is 
much lower. A noteworthy feature is the treatment of small businesses. An exemption of ¥10 
million excludes most potentially VAT-liable business firms from tax coverage. To prevent 
cumulative effects from occurring when these exempt firms (not being able to claim a credit for 
the VAT on their taxable inputs) sell their output to registered firms, the latter are permitted to 
compute their input tax credits on the basis of presumptively tax-inclusive prices.
29 As a result 
of this arrangement more tax than actually has been paid is refunded at the point of export and 
more tax than is actually paid with respect to similar domestically produced goods is imposed 
on imports, possibly in violation of the WTO treaty.
30  
2.2.2  Considerations affecting the choice between VAT and RST  
Experience indicates that most countries, when faced with the choice, have favoured a VAT 
over an RST, taking the view that in practice a VAT would be more broadly based than an RST, 
better equipped to free producer goods of tax and to apply correct BTAs, and easier to enforce. 
This can be illustrated by the experience in the EU, Norway, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia. 
 
In the 1960s, the then member states of the EU opted for a VAT because, unlike the cascade 
type of turnover tax levied previously, a VAT permits the precise and unambiguous 
computation of export rebates and compensating import taxes (Cnossen and Shoup, 1987). 
 
28 For the U.S. states, see Mikesell (2005 and 2008). Mikesell takes actual sales tax collections from the Census Bureau 
(with a few adjustments) and based on the statutory rate for each state, he develops an implicit tax base that he then 
compares to total personal income in the state. In each of the two fiscal years cited above, the mean implicit base is equal to 
about 44 percent of total personal income. In addition, personal consumption expenditures generally run about 83-84 
percent of personal income, meaning that the implicit sales base averages about 36.5 percent of personal consumption 
expenditures (.44 x .83). This includes tax on business inputs in computing the implicit sales tax base. About 40 percent of 
sales taxes are collected from businesses or business inputs. If those revenues are accounted for, the implicit sales tax 
base would equal to about 22 percent (.365 x .60) of personal consumption expenditures. For the EU, see Cnossen (2002).  
29 Letter from Hiromitsu Ishi (May 2010) (on file with the author). This approach, which effectively exempts the value added 
by non-registered firms, contrasts sharply with that of the usual VAT that increases the tax burden on non-registered firms 
selling their output to registered firms, inducing them to register and pay VAT. 
30 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 1, available at 
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Correct BTAs are considered to be an indispensable feature of any tax on goods and services 
that enter intra-EU trade. Subsequently, therefore, the adoption of a VAT became a condition 
for EU membership. Although an RST was considered by the Neumark Committee (1963) 
appointed to study the most appropriate consumption tax, it was rejected (p. 124) “on practical 
technical grounds … (given particularly the large number of small retailers of whom the 
majority are unable to maintain precise bookkeeping).” 
 
Denmark and Sweden switched from RST to VAT even before they became member of the EU 
(Shoup, 1969) and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (Due, 1997), all non-EU European 
countries, have also done so. These countries cited foreign trade considerations as the main 
reason for the switch. The prices of both exports and import-competing goods included an RST 
on certain producer goods and other business purchases. This implied that the equal-rate 
compensating import tax and the export rebate were insufficient to fully offset the burden of the 
RST on domestic products. More generally, a VAT's ability to tax goods and services more 
broadly and neutrally than an RST, and an expectation that a shift to a VAT would result in 
increased revenues – ostensibly, in many cases, as part of a general shift in emphasis from 
direct to indirect taxes – were cited in support of the switch. 
 
Norway is the only country in which the debate on the relative merits of a VAT vs. an RST 
continued long after the VAT was introduced in 1970 (Due and Brems, 1986). As reported by 
John Due and Ulla Brems, opponents of the VAT claimed that it was more costly for business 
firms and the tax administration than the RST had been. The majority of a government-
appointed committee that reported in 1975 supported their views. The committee also believed 
that the opportunity for fraud was somewhat greater under a VAT. Accordingly, it 
recommended that the government revert to an RST. Subsequently, the Norwegian Treasury 
(1985) was instructed to review the issues. Reporting in the mid-1980s, it concluded in favour 
of a VAT, pointing out that the exclusion of producer goods was more comprehensive under a 
VAT; that a large part of the tax was collected upstream from large firms with well-organized 
accounting systems, whereas under an RST much of the tax would have to be collected from 
small retailers; that VAT had a beneficial effect on accounting standards, with spillover benefits 
for the income tax and the property tax; that the number of businesses that had to be registered 
under a VAT was not significantly larger than the number that had been registered under an 
RST; that the transitional costs of a return to RST would be high; and, finally, that the claim 
that a VAT was more costly to administer and to comply with than an RST was ill-founded. 
This settled the controversy in favour of a VAT, which was maintained. 
 
Initially, the Government of Canada did not take an explicit position on the relative merits of a 
national RST vs. a national VAT. In June 1987, it put up for discussion the alternative of an 
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national VAT without any link with the provincial RSTs.
31 Despite extensive negotiations with 
the provinces, the integrated RST proved to be beyond reach. It was simply not possible to 
reform nine different RST regimes and consolidate them into one unified system. Perhaps this 
was not surprising, because as the Minister of Finance opined: “this had never been 
accomplished before anywhere in the world.” In April 1991, therefore, the Government went 
ahead with the introduction of a federal VAT. 
 
The choice between an RST and a VAT has also been debated in New Zealand and Australia. 
The Government of New Zealand, which introduced a VAT in 1986, took the view that a VAT 
would be more effective than an RST in ensuring compliance, owing to its multistage collection 
feature, its inclusion of imports in the tax base, and the more complete audit trail that the tax 
provided (New Zealand, 1985). Retailers, the least reliable participants in the collection process, 
would not be accountable for the full amount of the tax. Moreover, as in the EU, small 
taxpayers could be excluded by reference to their turnover, yet they would still pay tax on their 
inputs (being exempt, they would not be entitled to take credit for the tax on purchases). This 
arrangement would minimize administrative and compliance costs. The Government also 
concluded that, given a comprehensive tax base and a single rate, a VAT would be a more 
flexible revenue instrument than an RST. 
 
In Australia, the RST vs. VAT debate waxed and waned for more than 20 years. The Asprey 
Committee (1975) which was, perhaps, influenced by the recent introduction of a VAT in the 
UK, favoured a VAT over an RST, arguing that an RST was more susceptible to evasion. In 
contrast, the subsequent Australian Government Draft White Paper (1985) argued that an RST 
had significant administrative and compliance advantages relative to a VAT. The Government 
believed that the self-policing properties of a VAT (that is, the ability to cross-check invoices) 
had been overstated. While it accepted the argument that producer goods and exports could be 
more readily freed from tax under a VAT than under an RST, the longer lead-in time of a VAT 
persuaded it that RST was the right choice. Subsequent governments, however, leaned towards 
a VAT which, finally, emerged as the consumption tax of choice in 1998, largely on the basis of 
the same arguments as used earlier in New Zealand (Howard Government’s Plan, 1998). 
2.2.3  Conclusions 
This review shows a clear preference of a VAT over an RST. A VAT is the first consumption 
tax that has successfully integrated the taxation of goods with the taxation of services (Kay and 
Davis, 1990). A VAT is also better able to exclude business inputs, including dual-use goods 
and services, from the tax base, and thus to effect more even and complete BTAs. Beyond this, 
 
31 This left open the question whether the direct subtraction method (taxation of the difference between sales and 
purchases) or the indirect subtraction method (credit for tax on purchases against tax on sales) should be used. The study 
group appointed by the Minister of Finance initially favoured the direct subtraction method (called business transfer tax, or 
BTT) which, because of its resemblance to a business income tax, would minimize overlap and conflict with the provinces 
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a VAT is a more robust tax by requiring (large) pre-retail firms to collect the bulk of the tax 
from retailers, administratively the weakest link in the tax-collection chain.
32 The pre-taxation 
of business inputs, moreover, implies that a VAT can afford a much larger small-business 
exemption than an RST for the same amount of revenue foregone, which lessens collection and 
compliance costs.  
 
Prima facie, the main advantage of an RST is that it is inherently destination-based. An RST 
does not appear to require the explicit BTAs necessary under a VAT, that is, refunds of prior-
stage tax upon export and the imposition of an equal-rate tax upon import. In actual fact, the 
widespread taxation of business purchases means that RSTs contain a significant origin-based 
component. Moreover, it would not be simple or practical to apply BTAs that would accurately 
reflect the RST hidden in the prices of domestic products. Furthermore, the ease with which 
goods and services can be bought out of state increasingly calls the presumed advantage of “no 
BTAs” into question. VATs score higher on this point, at least with respect to business-to-
business (B2B) transactions. It may be that state VATs in the U.S. would be more neutral and 
robust tax instruments than current RSTs are. In this respect, the European experience and 
debates about VAT coordination may be instructive for U.S. policymakers. 
2.3  VAT coordination in the European Union 
In discussing the arrangements for BTAs in the EU, this paper makes a distinction between 
goods and services.
33 Prima facie, arrangements for BTAs on goods cannot deal effectively with 
(non-tangible) services whose location of supply or purchase is difficult to ascertain. 
2.3.1  Cross-border transactions in goods  
From 1993 onward, physical controls for the VAT on goods at interstate borders in the EU have 
been replaced by accounting controls at the first in-state stage of the production-distribution 
process. The VAT does not have to be paid upfront at the border.
34 Deferred payment had 
proven its feasibility in the Benelux. Its members (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) 
successfully applied the system to most of their interstate and international trade ever since they 
 
32 Presumably, the rationale of this arrangement is that taxable retailers are less likely to default on tax invoiced by their 
suppliers than on tax payable directly to the tax authorities as is the case under an RST. 
33 In EU VAT legislation (Article 24 of the 2006 VAT Directive), “supply of services” is defined simply as any transaction 
which does not constitute a supply of goods. 
34 Although correct if looked at from the border-VAT point of view, deferred payment is a misnomer when viewed in the 
domestic context, because it treats imported goods exactly on par with domestic goods, that is, the right to a tax credit arises 
at the same time that the VAT on supplies is accounted for – and this is as it should be. THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
48 
introduced the VAT in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
35  
 
Deferred payment places the charge to VAT on the acquisition of imported goods rather than on 
the physical import itself. The charge is reversed, as it were, by making the importer/buyer 
liable to tax, rather than the exporter/supplier. Registered firms of taxable imported goods have 
to include these goods (intra-community acquisitions are deemed to be a separate chargeable 
event) in the return due for the period in which the goods are imported. The VAT is self-
assessed and a credit is provided at the same time. Accordingly, no net VAT is due and payable 
(unless the acquisition is made by an exempt firm). This situation is depicted in figure 2.1.  
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For compliance purposes, the “self-declared VAT” replaces the previous “border VAT,” but no 
net VAT is due on the self-declaration; no “advance payment” is made. The two separate 
taxable events, that is, the acquisition and the domestic sale of goods, performed by one taxable 
person, may require only one return if the events take place in the same tax period. In either 
case, the full VAT is payable to the government (and receivable from the customer) when the 
importer sells the imported goods to the next stage of production or distribution. At that time 
the net VAT liability is €27 since there is no credit for the import VAT, which has already been 




35 As early as 1982, the European Commission proposed the EU-wide introduction of deferred payment (Draft Fourteenth 
VAT Directive), although border controls were to remain in place. In fact, importers of VAT-liable goods still had to hand over 
VAT documentation to customs authorities at the point of importation without actually being assessed for VAT at that point. 
Prior to 1993, deferred payment –called postponed accounting in the UK and Ireland – involved a one-time loss of revenue 
in the year of introduction, just like the withdrawal of deferred payment involved a one-time (perhaps politically opportune) 
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At the time the deferred payment system – called the transitional regime in abeyance of some 
definitive regime, discussed below – was introduced, customs controls for goods were replaced 
by a functionally equivalent, if perhaps less certain, VAT information exchange system 
(VIES).
36 VIES requires registered firms to report their intra-EU supplies (exports) to registered 
firms in other member states (indicating their VAT identification numbers preceded by a 
country code) on a monthly basis to the VAT authorities if the supplies exceed €100.000 in any 
of the previous four quarters (or quarterly if supplies are less than €100.000 (Council Directive, 
2008). Similarly, the purchaser has to report the total of his intra-community acquisitions (these 
obligations are called the listing requirement). The information is fed into a central data bank 
and should enable the various VAT administrations in the EU to match total intra-community 
acquisitions per trader against individually reported supplies. VIES imposes differentially 
higher compliance costs on interstate traders – a source of discrimination and trade distortion.
37 
 
Obviously, the removal of physical border controls made cross-border shopping by consumers 
more attractive. Although this was considered a price worth paying for the psychological 
benefit of a border-free EU, the member states agreed to make exceptions for the following 
three main items: 
 
•  Means of transport, such as motor vehicles, boats and airplanes, not bought through registered 
dealers, are taxed in the member state of registration, which is usually the same as the state of 
destination.  
•  Mail order firms with intra-community exports of more than €100.000 per member state per 
annum have to charge and remit the VAT of the destination state. Below that amount, firms 
have a choice between an origin and a destination basis of taxation. 
•  Exempt entities are subject to the VAT of the destination state if their cross-border purchases 
exceed €10.000. Purchases by exempt entities in excess of €10.000 are zero rated in the member 
state of origin and taxed as self-supplies in the destination state. 
 
2.3.2  Cross-border transactions in services
38  
The deferred payment system for goods introduced after 1993 had always been applicable to 
business-to-business (B2B) services.
39 Article 43 of Council Directive (2006) prescribes that 
services should in principle be taxed in the state where they are performed. Highly significant 
 
36 See Council Regulation (1992) replaced by Council Regulation (2003). Furthermore, a statistical data collection system, 
referred to as the Intrastat system, was set up to collect trade data on goods between member states (Council Regulation, 
1991) replaced by Council Regulation (2004), which extended the regulation’s coverage to services. Some time ago, the 
Intrastat obligations have been simplified. See European Parliament (2004). 
37 See Verwaal and Cnossen (2002). The authors point out that most of the differential costs should be attributed to Intrastat 
obligations (see footnote above), not to compliance with VAT obligations. 
38 For reviews of the situation in the EU, see Terra (2007), and for a general treatment, Millar (2007). 
39 Sinn (1990) predicted a wave of cross-border purchases of consumer goods after 1993, even though this “wave” was 
already a non-issue for services prior to 1993. In fact, the treatment of border-crossing services, before and after 1993, 
indicates that the implications of the break in the VAT chain for goods when border controls were abolished were not 
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exceptions, however, are made for services rendered by banks, insurance companies, 
professional firms, advertising agencies, and various other establishments – nearly all involving 
B2B transactions. Upon export, these services are zero-rated (“exempt,” in EU jargon, with the 
right to a credit for the VAT in respect of any inputs used in performing the services). In the 
importing state, furthermore, the services are treated as if they are inputs supplied by the 
importing firm itself (Article 21) and taxable as such via reverse charging. In 2008 (effective 
2010), the VIES reporting obligations for goods were extended to services (Council Directive, 
2008a).  
 
To put the cross-border treatment of services fully on par with the treatment of goods, new rules 
for the place where services are deemed to be rendered have recently been promulgated with the 
primary goal of taxing services as much as possible at the place of consumption or use (Council 
Directive, 2008). Basically, the exceptions have become the main rule: B2B services are 
deemed to be provided where the customer carries on his business.
40 As is the case with goods, 
the VAT identification number will play a crucial role in verifying compliance. Also, the 
correct determination of the place of establishment of the user of B2B services (and the place of 
the provider of business-to-consumer (B2C) services) will become more important. 
 
As shown in table 2.2, overriding exceptions are provided for immovable property, cultural 
services and education, restaurants and catering, transportation of persons, and short-term 
rentals of vehicles – all of which are deemed to be provided where the services are actually 
performed. The new main rule should reduce compliance costs, because out-of-state taxpayers 
will no longer have to file refund claims for VAT currently charged with respect to out-of-state 
services provided to them. Compliance costs, on the other hand, will increase through the listing 
requirement for cross-border services.  
 
The main rule for B2C services is that they are deemed to be provided at the place where the 
provider of the services carries on his business (including a permanent establishment). This 
resembles the VAT treatment of cross-border consumer purchases of goods which are taxed, 
with minor exceptions, on an origin basis. Again, various overriding exceptions are provided 
(see table 2.2). To limit administrative costs, furthermore, a mini one-stop-shop arrangement 
will be provided for telecommunication, radio, and television services (effective 2015) (Council 
Directive, 2008).
41 In the event, the provider of the services does not know the individual user 
or consumer. Accordingly, the tax on these services will be payable in the state where the 
 
40 Services that hitherto were taxable in the state of the provider, but will now be taxable in the state of  the customer include 
management services, arbitrage services, merchant and investment banking, rating and recruiting services, as well as 
intermediation services, intra-community transportation of goods, and services provided to movable property.  
41 The later effective date for this provision represents a side payment to Luxembourg, whose origin-based low VAT rate has 
attracted many telecommunication, radio, and television providers. Furthermore, Luxembourg will be able to skim off a 
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services are provided. Subsequently, that state will distribute the VAT revenue to the member 
states where the customers are located according to an agreed formula. 
Table 2.2  EU VAT: Exceptions to main rules for place of services from 2010 
Type of service  Place where performed 
   
A. Business-to-Business services (B2B)   
   
Main rule  Place of purchaser 
Exceptions   
Immovable property, including real estate agents and holiday 
accommodation        
Where immovable property is situated 
Cultural services, education      
  - admissions to cultural services 
Where activities actually take place 
  -where activities actually performed (2011) 
Restaurants, catering 
  -catering on ships, planes, trains 
Where services actually performed 
  -place of departure 
Transportation of persons  Place proportionate to distance 
Short-term vehicle rentals (30 days or less)  Place where vehicle provided 
   
B. Business-to-Consumer services (B2C)   
   
Main rule  Place of purchaser 
Exceptions   
Immovable property, including real estate agents and holiday 
accommodation        
Where immovable property is situated 
Cultural services, education      Where activities actually take place 
Restaurants, catering 
  -catering on ships, planes, trains 
Where services actually performed 
  -place of departure 
Transportation of goods and persons 
  -loading and unloading 
Place proportionate to distance 
  -where actually performed 
Rental of vehicles 
  -short-term (30 days or less) 
  -long term 
 
Place where provided 
Place of customer 
Rentals of pleasure boats  Place where provided (2013) 
Independent agents  Place of underlying transactions 
Telecommunications, radio an TV services  Place of customer (2015) 
Electronic services  Place of customer (2015) 
   
Source: Council Directive (2008).   
 
2.3.3  Conclusion 
After 1993, conventional intra-EU customs controls for VAT on goods were replaced by 
accounting controls, which applied already to B2B services. The previous controls served as an 
effective backstop for country-specific VAT verification and enforcement. In lieu of these 
controls, VIES was introduced which should enable member states to cross-check intra-
community acquisitions against supplies and vice versa. Whether this information and 
verification system works should be reflected in the extent of VAT evasion attributable to the 
new arrangements to which I now turn.  THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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2.4  VAT evasion in the European Union 
As a transactions-based but accounts-controlled tax, a VAT should be at least as susceptible to 
fraud as other accounts-controlled taxes, such as the income taxes.
42 This section discusses 
various forms of VAT fraud, especially cross-border fraud, that is, claiming false refunds on 
exports or not remitting VAT on imports.
43 
2.4.1  Forms of VAT evasion 
VAT fraud comes in various guises, but the following main types can be distinguished, listed in 
their most likely order of importance.
44  
 
•  Shadow economy fraud. Genuine individuals and businesses with a turnover above the 
registration threshold deliberately do not register for the VAT. In many member states, this 
phenomenon comprises a large number of individuals who render all kinds of services “VAT-
free,” often by using or buying taxable inputs from their own or employer’s business. Examples 
of VAT-free services are plumbing, carpeting, painting, gardening, catering, hairdressing, car 
repairs, and various other services (sometimes rendered on a barter basis). 
•  Suppression fraud. Genuine businesses that understate their sales or falsely inflate their claims 
for VAT on purchases,
45 including individuals who “consume through the business”, that is, 
withdraw goods and services from their own or their employer’s business for personal 
consumption without being charged for them, while the business takes credit for the VAT on 
inputs. 
•  Insolvency fraud. Genuine businesses (operating in the domestic market only) purchase taxable 
goods, which they sell on (often at inflated prices), providing high tax credits to (related) 
purchasers, and subsequently go insolvent without paying their VAT liabilities. 
•  Carousel fraud. Also called Missing Trader Intra-community (MITC) fraud in which fraudsters 
register for VAT, buy goods VAT-free from another member state, sell them on at VAT-
inclusive prices and then disappear without paying the VAT due.
46 Unless the context implies 
otherwise, in this paper, carousel fraud also encompasses other kinds of cross-border VAT 
fraud. 
 
42 The widely recognized availability of refunds under VAT – something that income taxes generally do not allow – may 
make the VAT more vulnerable to fraud than the income tax. The VAT base, that is, business transactions, on the other 
hand, is much more obvious than the income tax base, which should make fraud less likely 
43 For reviews of VAT fraud, see Harrison and Krelove (2005), and Keen and Smith (2006). For an interesting comparison of 
VAT and income tax fraud based on the Danish experience of cross-border shopping and income shifting, see Gordon and 
Nielsen (1997). This study suggests that Denmark, which has a high uniform VAT rate of 25 percent, could reduce the real 
costs of evasion activity by relying even more on VAT. 
44 This draws on the distinction made by UK National Audit Office (2004).  
45 According to UK National Audit Office (2004), around a third of traders in the UK under-declare their VAT liability for a 
variety of reasons 
46 For a useful, simple example of carousel fraud, see Keen and Smith (2006). According to the European Commission 
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•  Bogus traders. Fraudsters register for VAT, make false claims for repayments (paid out by the 
VAT office!) and then abscond. 
 
2.4.2  Scale of the problem 
Attempts to estimate VAT fraud can be distinguished in top-down or national accounts 
approaches and bottom-up or operational and intelligence analyses. Under the top-down 
approach, the full-compliance VAT is calculated from national accounts data on taxable 
consumption and intermediate inputs of exempt sectors, corrected for VAT revenue foregone on 
account of the small-business exemption.
47 This full-compliance VAT is then compared with 
actual collections and the difference, expressed as a percentage of full-compliance collections, 
is called the VAT gap. Operational or intelligence analyses, on the other hand, project country-
wide VAT evasion from the results of individual or sector-wide investigations.  
 
Based on old data, averaged for the period 1994-1996, Andrea Gebauer, Chang Woon Nam and 
Rüdiger Parsche (2005) have calculated the top-down VAT gaps for 10 EU member states. The 
VAT gap of 2.4 percent in the Netherlands, a small and open economy, is surprisingly small.
48 
In Italy, on the other hand, the gap is more than one-third of potential collections.
49 Not 
surprisingly perhaps, the size of the VAT gap is roughly correlated with the size of the shadow 
economy. VAT fraud for the whole EU is estimated at €6 billion to €100 billion.
50 
 
Gebauer, Nam and Parsche (2005) pay special attention to the situation in Germany. They 
report a rapid growth in VAT evasion in the three years since the abolition of border controls, 
culminating in an annual evasion rate ranging from 6-8 percent in 1996, which increased further 
to nearly 10 percent in 2001. In the latter year, approximately one-third of the estimated evaded 
VAT could be attributed to “the fast expansion of the so-called (tax avoiding) daisy-chain 
businesses (Karusellgeschäfte)” (Dziadkowski et al, 2002). It is not clear, however, how this 
figure is arrived at or the breakdown of the remaining amount of evasion.  
 
Subsequently, Rüdiger Parsche provided figures to the European Parliament on VAT evasion in 
Germany.
51 Updated figures are shown in table 2.3 along with similar data reported for the UK. 
It should be noted that the data are only broadly comparable and that the VAT revenue loss 
 
47 The national accounts data include corrections for the shadow economy, calculated using the currency-demand approach 
discussed in Schneider and Ernste (2000). The demand-currency approach postulates that countries with a high ratio of 
currency to GDP have a larger shadow economy and a lower tax compliance ratio than countries with a lower currency-GDP 
ratio. For an analysis that relates the level of the VAT rate to the extent of evasion and avoidance, see Matthews (2003). 
48 UK National Audit Office (2004) reports that the Netherlands set up a carousel fraud unit in 1998, which adopted a 
strategy of focusing primarily on identifying those firms which were committing the fraud. Reportedly, one of their main 
sources of information is the VIES data. 
49 For an analysis of VAT evasion in Greece (not included in the study), estimated at 25 percent of VAT revenue, see 
Agapitos (1999). 
50 International VAT Association (2007). See also speech by Lásló Kovács (2006). 
51 Letter from Rüdiger Parsche to the author, July 17, 2008 (on file with the author), with tables on the quantification of the 
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through insolvencies may only be partially related to VAT evasion, although evading VAT by 
going broke (after charging VAT to customers), practiced long before 1993 (sic!), is the typical 
domestic variant of intra-community carousel fraud. Table 2.3 clearly indicates that shadow 
economy and suppression tax fraud – in other words, “domestic fraud” – account for the lion’s 
share of VAT fraud. By contrast, carousel fraud makes up 10 percent of total fraud in Germany 
and 25 percent in the UK. 
Table 2.3  Germany and United Kingdom: Estimates of VAT fraud and evasion in 2001-2002 
Type of non-compliance                 Revenue loss as percent of full-compliance VAT 
     
  Germany  UK 
     
Shadow economy, including consumption through the  
business and non-registration 
5.5  5.3 
Suppression and insolvency fraud  2.3  3.3 
Abuse of tax credits  2.1  - 
Carousel fraud  1.1  3.2 
Non-registration  -  0.6 
Total revenue loss  11.1  12.4 
     
Sources: Germany – figures provided to the author by Rüdiger Parsche, which he had presented to the European Parliament in early 
2008 (correspondence on file with the author). UK – author’s computations based on UK National Audit Office (2004, p. 11).  
 
In its latest publication, UK Revenue and Customs (2007) estimates the VAT gap at 14.2 
percent in 2006-2007, down from 16.1 percent in 2002-2003. Using operational data (which are 
not revealed as this may have a detrimental effect on compliance activity), the loss from MTIC 
VAT fraud – of which carousel fraud is the most serious form – is estimated at ₤1-2 billion, or 
12 percent of the total net VAT revenue loss for 2006-2007. This is less than the revenue loss 
associated with the illicit market in cigarettes and hand rolling tobacco, which is estimated at 
₤1.6-3.2 billion in 2005-2006. Again, MTIC VAT-fraud in the UK, as well as Germany, 
although serious, is only a fraction of the total VAT fraud committed in either country. 
2.4.3  Measures to combat fraud 
Member states have taken various legal measures to combat VAT fraud (including carousel 
fraud), among others by refusing the right to a tax credit on the ground that the transaction is 
devoid of economic substance (abuse of rights doctrine). In Optigen (2006), the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ)
52 ruled that the doctrine could not be applied to taxpayers acting in good faith, 
but in Kittel (2006)
53 and Halifax (2006) it held that, subject to certain conditions, mala fide 
taxpayers could be denied the right to tax credit. The ECJ (Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise, 2006) also confirmed the validity of measures requiring specified traders to provide 
 
52 For a useful review of the ECJ cases and other measures to combat fraud, see Balcerowicz (2007). 
53 In Kittel, the ECJ opined that “…where it ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable 
person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with 
fraudulent evasion of value-added tax, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person’s entitlement to the right to 
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financial security, for example, for charging VAT which results in a credit, although it 
stipulated that security for a VAT liability due from another taxpayer can not be required. 
Furthermore, various member states have introduced joint and several VAT liability rules under 
Article 205 of the VAT Directive if, at the time of the transaction, taxpayers knew or had 
reasonable ground to suspect that some or all of the VAT payable in respect of the supply 
would go unpaid. According to the European Commission (2004b), this measure “has had a 
clear deterrent effect and seems to be effective.” 
 
At the EU level, VIES-II has been launched, which will improve the reliability, scope, and 
speed of information exchange regarding intra-EU transactions subject to VAT.
54 In addition, 
under the new system of administrative cooperation, Central Liaison Offices have been set up in 
the member states to facilitate information exchange, among others, on irregular (carousel) 
transactions.
55 Importantly, member states can second their auditors to investigation units in 
other member states. The European Commission has also issued a helpful risk management 
guide for tax administrations, which was prepared by tax officials from the member states as 
part of the Fiscalis Risk Analysis Project (European Commission, 2006).  
 
Apparently, member states do not make sufficient use of the available legal and administrative 
arrangements. While the European Commission (2006b) opines that “the Community legal 
framework in the field of administrative cooperation on VAT…appears to be 
satisfactory…[and] offers real possibilities for cooperation between Member States,” the latter 
do not make sufficient use of the instruments due to language problems and lack of specialized 
resources. Perhaps more can be done to provide the right kind of training and financial 
incentives for participating staff.  
2.4.4  Conclusion 
In reviewing the figures on VAT fraud and evasion, one must concur with Keen and Smith’s 
(2006, p. 872) lament that “there is strikingly little hard evidence – publicly available, at least – 
on the extent of non-compliance (including outright fraud) under the VAT” in the EU. What 
seems clear, however, is that shadow economy and suppression fraud are much more important 
than carousel fraud, which gets so much attention. No doubt, the reason is that shadow economy 
and suppression fraud generally involve a large number of low-profile cases involving small 
amounts of VAT. By contrast, insolvency and carousel fraud, although occurring much less 




54 For more information regarding VIES II, visit the website of the European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union. For 
a useful description of the purposes, legal mechanisms, workings and rules governing international information exchange, 
see Perez-Navarro (undated). 
55 This is facilitated through Eurocanet, a program of mutual assistance between member states’ fiscal and law enforcement 
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Keen and Smith (2006, p. 884) refer to current arrangements as “ad hoc enforcement 
strategies,” rejecting them in favour of their deep solution, which would “fix the VAT chain by 
ending the zero-rating of trade between member states.” In their view and that of the 
Commission, intra-community supplies should be taxed (called exporter rating) rather than 
zero-rated, while the recipients of these supplies in importing states should be permitted a tax 
credit for an equivalent amount. To restore the revenue allocation under the destination 
principle, the exporting state should be obliged to pay the VAT collected on exports to 
importing states. These proposals are examined in the following section.  
2.5  Exporter rating proposals 
The exporter rating proposals can be usefully distinguished between those made by the 
European Commission and proposals found in the tax literature. 
2.5.1  European Commission proposals 
I first proposed exporter rating in 1983 (Cnossen, 1983), suggesting that export-VAT 
collections and import-VAT credits should be settled through an EU-wide clearinghouse 
system. In essence, only net balances (the excess of VAT collections on exports over VAT 
credits on imports) would have to be settled between member states. In 1985, the European 
Commission adopted the proposal in a paper known as the Cockfield White Paper (European 
Commission, 1985); it forms the organizing principle of subsequent exporter rating proposals.  
 
The workings of exporter rating, involving the exportation of goods (or services) from Austria 
to Estonia, is illustrated in figure 2.2. The Austrian export sale is taxed at 20 percent and the 
corresponding VAT amount would be allowed as a tax credit to the importer in Estonia. If the 
importer sold the goods at €150 in the same tax period in which he imported it, he would pay a 
net VAT of €7. On the other hand, if he would keep the goods in stock (and did not make any 
taxable sales), he would receive a refund of €20, but would have to file a return. Furthermore, 
Austria would pay the VAT it collected from its exporter to Estonia, which would use it, as it 
were, to finance a tax credit for the same amount allowed to its importer. Importantly, VAT 
revenue allocation between the two countries is the same as under a system, such as deferred 
payment, which zero rates exports. 
 
The Commission’s arguments, however, failed to persuade the governments of the member 
states that wanted to retain full control over the VAT administration of imports and exports, 
and, therefore, opted for the deferred payment scheme that had proved its feasibility in Benelux, 
although they agreed that exporter rating should receive a second hearing. In the tax literature, 
moreover, Catherine Lee, Mark Pearson, and Stephen Smith (1980) criticized the Commission’s 
clearinghouse proposal, pointing out that it had an adverse impact on enforcement incentives, 
because importing member states might not be inclined to root out fraudulent claims for import     EXPORTER RATING PROPOSALS 
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VAT credits (after all, these presumably would be paid by exporting states), while exporting 
states would have little incentive to uncover fraudulent failure to charge VAT on exports. 
Solving this problem would require uncoupling the clearinghouse flows from taxes actually 
paid. 
Figure 2.2  Exporter Rating 
Export transaction
Export sale of €100
VAT imposed on export 
to Estonia at Austrian 
rate of 20%
VAT liability
20% x €100 = €20
Domestic sale
Sale of output
€150 + 18% VAT = 
€177 price for final 
good
VAT liability
€27 on sale - €20 VAT 




Exporter in Austria Importer in Estonia
Clearing house flow:





Net revenue in Austria = 0 Net revenue in Estonia
€20 + €7 = €27
€177
 
Subsequently, the European Commission (1996) made another attempt to persuade the member 
states of the benefits of exporter rating. Since intra-EU exports are zero rated under deferred 
payment, the Commission noted that more than €700 billion worth of goods circulated VAT-
free in the internal market, and observed that due to the break in the VAT-collection chain 
“some of that amount may well be diverted to the black economy” (European Commission, 
1996, p. 4).
56 The Commission placed its proposal against the backdrop of a principled critique 
of the 1977 VAT Sixth Directive.
57 
 
The fresh proposal had the following main elements. Goods and services were to be taxed at the 
place of business establishment of the seller instead of the location of the transaction. This 
implied a single place of taxation for each business (instead of two, as under the deferred 
payment regime), even if operating throughout the EU; hence, the reference to home-state 
taxation. Furthermore, zero rating of intra-EU transactions would be abolished. Instead, cross-
 
56 In light of the fact that the time period in which VAT has to be accounted for and remitted to the authorities is generally the 
same as the time period in which VAT is received from purchasers, all goods and services, not just intra-community traded 
products, circulate VAT free within the ring of registered firms. 
57 It pointed out that the VATs in the EU were unnecessarily complex (as shown by differences in the place of supply rules, 
the special schemes and the rules applicable to non-residents), while VAT enforcement relied too much on physical controls. 
Also, there were wide differences in the application of the common VAT between member states, such as special 
arrangements, options, temporary or transitional derogations, which had not been repealed, shortcomings in transpositions 
or differences in the interpretation of common provisions. This verdict applies to this day. THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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border sales would be taxed in the same fashion as domestic sales and cross-border movement 
of goods within the same business would go untaxed. As a collorary, importers would be able to 
credit the VAT on purchases from other member states against their own VAT liability. VAT 
revenues on intra-community transactions would be allocated between member states on the 
basis of statistics of aggregate consumption (instead of the aggregation of VAT on individual 
export and import transactions, as under the initial proposal). The Commission also proposed 
complete uniformity in the scope and definition of the VAT, and very close convergence of 
rates.  
 
In a trenchant commentary, Stephen Smith (1997) pointed out that the new proposal would put 
substantial limitations on member states autonomy to set rates, require an extensive program of 
legislative harmonization, cause difficulties in identifying firms entitled to be taxed in a single 
member state, and a flight of businesses to least-taxed locations or, if rates were the same, to 
states where VAT evasion would be less tightly controlled. Also, revenue allocation rules (on 
the basis of aggregate consumption) would undermine incentives to devote adequate resources 
to VAT collection and enforcement.  
 
Again, the proposal did not leave the drawing board, but was briefly resurrected in 2004 as the 
one-stop shop proposal under which exporters would be able to discharge all their obligations 
with respect to border-crossing transactions at one place only, that is, their place of 
establishment.
58 Users would only have to register once through the system and would get a 
single VAT number. This time clearing would not be necessary because exporters would be 
required to remit the gross VAT collected by them and calculated at the destination-state rate 
directly to the state of final destination, an idea which had earlier been proposed by Frans 
Vanistendael (1995). Few details were provided.  
2.5.2  Proposals in the tax literature 
Basically three proposals for VAT coordination have been made in the tax literature. They go 
by the names of Viable integrated VAT (VIVAT), Compensating VAT (CVAT), and dual VAT 
(D-VAT). 
Viable integrated VAT (VIVAT) 
In the belief that the alleged break in the VAT collection chain threatens VAT’s integrity, 
Michael Keen and Stephen Smith (1996) made an imaginative, high-profile proposal for a 
viable integrated VAT (VIVAT), which would consist of the following elements: 
 
 
58 Some details can be gleaned from European Commission (2004) and (2004a). The one-stop shop proposal may receive 
further scrutiny in the run up to the implementation by 2010 of the Services Directive (Council Directive, 2006a), which calls 
for “points of single contact” in each member state where traders can discharge all their obligations with respect to other 
member states. As noted above, a mini one-stop shop has been adopted under Council Directive (2008).     EXPORTER RATING PROPOSALS 
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•  An EU-wide uniform VAT rate, administered by member states, on all intermediate (non-retail) 
transactions between VAT registered traders, within and between member states. Accordingly, 
interstate exporters would be taxed and interstate importers would be allowed a credit at the 
same uniform rate. 
•  A clearing mechanism for payments from net exporting states to net importing states, based on 
export and import statistics (derived from VAT returns!) and allocated to member states on the 
basis of consumption statistics. This would ensure the maintenance of the destination principle, 
except for cross-border consumer purchases. 
•  A surtax on retail sales to consumers (in essence, an RST element, because it is imposed on 
retail sales only) for member states wishing to collect more revenue than accruing to them 
under the EU rate. 
•  Retention of the special schemes for distance sales and means of transport, but perhaps not for 
exempt entities since their inputs would be taxed at the uniform rate applicable to cross-border 
purchases. 
 
Accordingly, sellers would have to separate sales into three categories: (a) sales to registered 
persons within the EU subject to the EU-rate, (b) sales to unregistered persons within the EU 
(in- as well as out-of-state) subject to the higher member state rate, and (c) sales for export 
outside the EU, subject to the zero rate. 
 
Keen and Smith (1996), as well as Ian Crawford, Michael Keen, and Stephen Smith (2010) 
believe that a VIVAT would bolster the destination principle (and hence state autonomy, called 
subsidiarity in the EU), because revenue would continue to accrue where goods and services are 
consumed. The commonality of the EU rate would lessen the pressure on the clearing system 
and enforcement. Traders would be able to report exports and imports in aggregate rather than 
per member state. The uniform rate would remove the incentive for strategic rate setting, that is, 
the incentive member states would have under exporter rating with non-harmonised rates to tax 
exports higher because the VAT would be creditable anyway in importing states. The hassle of 
the clearing system could be resolved through a one-off deal, that is, a system of lump sum 
transfers between member states, obviating the need for future clearing.
59 
 
The VIVAT, however, would not be without problems. As I have argued (Cnossen, 2010), 
uniform exporter rating may appear to repair the break in the VAT-collection chain, but does 
nothing to solve the break in the VAT-audit trail. Importing member states would still not be 
able to audit importers’ invoices (received from exporters in other member states) for which 
they have no authority. This would provide a powerful incentive to produce false import 
invoices, showing VAT eligible for credit instead of no VAT as under the current regime. In 
 
59 It is difficult to view this as an advantage of the VIVAT, since any attempt at strategic rate setting would be stopped in its 
tracks by the ECJ on the ground that it would be a gross violation of the non-discrimination principle. THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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fact, bogus export transactions, allegedly prevalent under the current regime, might be replaced 
by bogus import transactions.  
 
Furthermore, under the VIVAT, member states with a greater than average preference for a 
VAT would have to impose an additional RST. In other words, they would have to incur higher 
administrative and compliance costs than currently and than member states making do with the 
revenue collected under the VIVAT rate. Registered traders, moreover, would have to make a 
distinction between sales made to other registered traders (taxable at the VIVAT rate) and sales 
made to non-registered persons, that is, individuals and exempt entities (taxed at the RST-
inclusive rate) – “not a trivial burden,” as Keen and Smith (1996, p. 406) admit. The RST 
element would have most of the drawbacks of a normal RST, noted in the literature (see above), 
although most tax would be fractionally collected throughout the production-distribution stage. 
 
Beyond that, it is difficult to envisage a uniform VIVAT rate in light of the established 
preference for greater rate differentials shown by the member states. Currently, moreover, 
reduced rates are levied on a product-specific basis. Their application (with revenue 
consequences) to intermediate transactions (quite a different matter) would complicate VIVAT 
and open up other avenues for fraud, particularly if it is not possible to audit import invoices. 
Politically, the VIVAT would further entrench the (high) VAT rate agreement in the EU, 
making it more difficult to convert the differentiated rate structures into single uniform rates 
(advocated by Crawford, Keen and Smith, 2010!) or to reduce the VAT rates in individual 
member states at some future date.  
Compensating VAT (CVAT) 
A proposal to repair the break in the VAT audit trail has been made by Charles McLure (2000), 
based on Ricardo Versano’s (1999) idea for coordinating the VATs of the Brazilian states. 
McLure aims his proposal, which he calls compensating VAT (CVAT) mainly at developing 
countries, but believes that it also has relevance for the EU. The proposal features the retention 
of state VATs, at differentiated rates, and the deferred payment system for interstate trade. 
Intra-EU trade (zero-rated under state VATs), however, would be subject to an export tax 
administered by a central agency, which would use the revenue to finance an equivalent tax 
rebate on imports. Accordingly, there would be no need for a tax-clearing mechanism, but the 
CVAT would require a uniform tax base and administration for the EU export/import tax as 
well as the state VATs. 
 
Essentially, the CVAT solves the problem of fraudulent export and import invoices for the state 
VAT administrations (apparently for goods only, not for services!) by performing audits at the 
central level through a charge-and-refund system, but if these audits were introduced, there 
would seem to be no reason to adopt an additional no-revenue raising tax. In the event, it then     EXPORTER RATING PROPOSALS 
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would be better to have a less costly central audit agency to which cases can be referred on a 
selective basis.  
 
As Keen and Smith (1999) have pointed out, the CVAT currently is not an option in the EU if 
there is to be a central administration. The same applies to the dual VAT (D-VAT) proposed by 
Bird and Gendron (1998) based on Canadian experience, which features separate provincial 
VATs under the umbrella of a federal VAT.  
2.5.3  Further analysis by the European Commission 
So far, the basic arguments in favour of exporter rating have been that it would repair the break 
in the VAT collection chain and treat intra-community exports on par with domestic 
transactions. A recent European Commission (2008) Staff Working Paper elaborates 
specifically on the use of exporter rating as an instrument to combat MTIC fraud. In the 
example used in the paper, intra-community exports would be taxed at a uniform rate of 15 
percent, which would be creditable by the importer in the importing member state upon the 
presentation of an invoice (self-declarations would still be required for imports subject to a 
higher or a lower rate than 15 percent). Any excess of VAT collections over VAT credits would 
be settled through bilateral clearing mechanisms based on microeconomic data collected from 
exporters and importers, preferably on the basis of monthly recapitulative statements.  
 
As the Working Paper acknowledges, the proposal would raise a number of political, economic 
and technical issues, which would require further discussion.  
 
•  Member states would become dependent on each other for some €30 billion of VAT revenue – 
on average, about 10 percent of total receipts. The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and Ireland 
would become large net contributors to the clearing system. They would have to pay over the 
VAT billed to them by importing member states, irrespective of whether or not they had been 
able to collect it, or knowing for sure whether or not the claim was correct. Accordingly, the 
level of mutual trust would have to be exceptionally high. This is not likely to come about, inter 
alia in view of the variation in the levels of VAT fraud discussed above. 
•  The collection of the VAT on intra-community exports would imply an advance payment of 
tax, which the Commission’s staff estimates at €360 billion
60, similar to the earlier conventional 
system of VAT collection at internal borders. The interest charge on the pre-financed tax most 
likely would be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices and would be particularly 
harmful to small businesses.  
 
60 The estimate is based on a total value of intra-community purchases of €2400 billion made by 2.5 million businesses 
across the EU, approximately 9 percent of all taxpayers. The “advance payment” would be much less (and, in my view, 
might not even exist) if exporters’ VAT payment terms were the same as importers’ commercial payment terms (and if the 
claim to a tax credit or refund in importing states would be effected at approximately the same time that importers have to 
pay the VAT charged by exporters). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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•  The 15 percent VAT on exports might induce traders to purchase lower-rated domestic 
commodities over higher-rated imports, and vice versa, even though the import VAT would be 
fully creditable and refundable, if required. 
•  Compliance and administrative costs would increase on account of the extra reporting and 
verification requirements necessitated by the microeconomic clearing system. Extra compliance 
costs would be imposed on exporters who would have to make a distinction between (a) 
domestic supplies taxable at the normal rate, (b) intra-community supplies taxable at 15 percent, 
and (c) exports to third countries taxable at the zero rate.  
•  Mismatches between supply and acquisition listings would arise on account of reporting failures 
as well as differences in the chargeability rules for the VAT. In theory, for the EU as a whole, 
acquisitions should match intra-community supplies. In sharp contrast, the excess of reported 
acquisitions over supplies was €80 billion in 2006. At a rate of 15 percent, the potential amount 
of VAT involved could be €12 billion. 
•  Exporter rating would provide an incentive to produce false import invoices (possibly through 
third countries) in order to qualify for a tax credit. Rate differences might still be exploited for 
fraudulent MTIC purposes, although on a smaller scale. 
 
2.5.4  Evaluation of exporter rating proposals 
Perhaps the time has come to lay the various exporter rating proposals in the EU to rest. It is 
hard to avoid the impression that early on the proposals were heavily predicated on the 
assumption that a solution had to be found for the VAT treatment of interstate trade in 
(physical) goods
61 – so central to the EU’s 1992 programme – while the practice and experience 
before 1993 with deferred payment for the “importation” of (intangible) services (as well as for 
goods in Benelux) indicated that deferred payment was a viable alternative. Also, the early 
preference for some form of exporting rating may have reflected an undue focus on the break in 
the VAT collection chain.
62 It is not the break in the VAT-collection chain, however, that 
weakens the efficacy of the tax’s fractional multistage collection mechanism, but the break in 




It is also hard to avoid the conclusion that the attention devoted to carousel fraud committed at 
interstate borders, so similar to insolvency fraud on the domestic scene, is out of proportion to 
the significance of the issue. Of course, carousel fraud should be tackled, and forcefully, but it 
is only one aspect of the VAT evasion picture, and apparently not the most important one. VAT 
 
61 See, for instance, Keen and Smith (1996, p. 393), who make their case for the VIVAT against the background of the 
abolition of “effective border controls.” 
62 According to Keen and Smith (1996, p. 386), zero-rating exports breaks “the cumulation of revenues throughout the 
production process…crudely put, the government gets its hands on the money sooner rather than later.” This view is 
incorrect, however: under VAT there is no cumulation of revenue and, in principle, the timing of tax payments does not differ 
from the timing under an RST. See Cnossen (1987). 
63 This problem would not occur in the U.S., of course, with a common tax administration in the form of the IRS.     EXPORTER RATING PROPOSALS 
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revenue lost through carousel fraud appears to be dwarfed by shadow economy fraud, 
suppression fraud, and insolvency fraud. Like other kinds of fraud inherent to taxes based on 
voluntary compliance, VAT fraud should be detected through verification and audit, followed 
up, if indicated, by investigation and prosecution. System changes rarely cure the problem of 
tax evasion, but rather divert attention from compliance control issues.
64 Why impose additional 
obligations on honest traders while carousel fraud is being undertaken by a small number of 
sophisticated criminal gangs? (UK House of Lords, 2007).  
 
In a trenchant commentary on VAT fraud and coordination issues in the EU, the International 
VAT Association (2007) concludes that comprehensive (non-targeted) exporter rating is fraught 
with political challenges. Instead, it argues for strengthening fiscal cooperation between 
member states, among others by improving VIES and establishing a multi-jurisdictional VAT 
enforcement unit. In its view, deferred payment, despite its flaws, has contributed effectively to 
the collection of a destination-based VAT.  
 
The gist of this commentary is echoed in statements by the European Commission and in the tax 
literature. As the European Commission (2006a) opined “the solution to missing trader fraud 
can be found in increased VAT control based on risk analysis rather than in changing the basic 
tax rules...”
65 Furthermore, Gebauer, Nam, and Parsche (2005, p. 480) recommend “more 
accurate cross-border information exchange, accompanied by joint audits among countries...”
66 
And earlier, Bird and Gendron (1998, p. 439) allowed for a virtual, functionally equivalent D-
VAT in the form of “some closely coordinated overarching administrative structure which 
would, for example, facilitate and insure information exchanges, development of agreed audit 
plans, and so on,” in order to give states the capacity to monitor cross-border transactions.  
 
The message is loud and clear. Basically, exporter rating does not obviate the need for auditing 
domestic and cross-border transactions. Proper domestic and multi-jurisdictional audit, on the 
other hand, would obviate the need for costly design changes whose reporting requirements 
might be just as or more burdensome than the requirements under deferred payment. The legal 
and administrative-cooperation arrangements appear sufficient for the time being to tackle 
cross-border VAT evasion, while maintaining the explicit deferred payment system 
(supplemented by some targeted exporter rating rules). The problem is that member states 
 
64 As Harrison and Krelove (2006, p. 36) opine: “Experience strongly suggests that the VAT is feasible only as a self-
assessed tax, meaning that substitutes for effective risk-based approaches within a self-assessment environment cannot be 
expected to provide sustainable solutions to compliance problems…”. 
65 The previous Taxation and Internal Market Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein (2004), believed that “[f]raud can be combated 
effectively without making drastic changes to the VAT system as long as Member States continue both to co-operate with 
each other and to make improvements to their individual national control arrangements.” 
66 In a later publication, Andrea Gebauer, Chang Woon Nam, and Rüdiger Parsche (2007) point out that “ït is not evident 
why the financial means required for the establishment of extensive control mechanisms in a new system could not also be 
used for the improvement of the present system.” THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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should make better use of existing administrative cooperation arrangements and be more willing 
to assist other member states in their endeavour to catch VAT evaders.  
 
Intensified cross-border audit would reduce the need for reliance on VIES. This form of 
information exchange (not practiced for domestic transactions or for international transactions 
under the corporation tax) resembles the universal cross-checking arrangements in China and 
Korea. Harrison and Krelove (2005, p. 27) report that the Korean experience showed that data 
capture was time-consuming, costly, and prone to error. Numerous mismatches were identified 
but most were the result of transcription errors, incomplete data, and valid timing differences, 
rather than due to fraudulent claims. Indeed, this finding is corroborated by the €80 billion 
mismatch in the EU as computed by the European Commission (2008). Not surprisingly, 
Harrison and Krelove (2005, p. 28) report that the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International 
Monetary Fund “remains of the view that large-scale cross-checking systems are a poor 
substitute for well-designed audit programs based on risk assessments, selective [emphasis 
added] cross-checking, intelligence gathering, and targeted fraud investigation.”
67 This 
conclusion might also be true for VIES. 
2.6  The German and Austrian proposal 
2.6.1  Main features 
Germany and Austria have argued that the opportunities for carousel fraud would be eliminated 
if the liability for VAT were shifted from suppliers to purchasers of taxable goods and services 
(European Commission, 2008). Reverse charging, comprehensively applied, would suspend the 
VAT liability throughout all pre-retail stages of production and distribution and, in effect, 
transform a VAT into an RST. The main difference with a conventional RST would be that the 
proposal envisages the retention (and intensification) of the cross-checking properties of a non-
tax invoice-based “VAT.” 
 
On the basis of the proposals made in Germany, Gebauer, Nam and Parsche (2007, pp. 6-9) 
distinguish three forms of reverse charging, depending on, among others, whether or not a 
threshold is incorporated and whether or not cash transactions are included. All variants require 
the issue of a special VAT identification number, the online verification of the identification 
number of the purchaser, and the reporting of all transactions by identification number, which 
can then be cross-checked by the tax authorities. A prototype reverse charge system is shown in 
Figure 2.3 (without the complications of the threshold or the exemption of cash transactions). 
 
67 In a domestic context, Harrison and Krelove (2005, p. 28) point out that the execution of a well-designed audit program is 
the most critical element in a program to reduce the incidence of VAT fraud. In the context of an audit risk management 
approach, they recommend, among others, audit of accounting systems, however time-consuming, rather than individual 
transaction checking, especially with large taxpayers. Close coordination of the VAT audit program with audit programs of 
other taxes, particularly income tax, is also required. Most of these elements should also feature in cross-border programs.     THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL 
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Clearly, no registered VAT-company pays any tax, except Company C, selling to consumers or 
other non-registered entities.  
Figure 2.3  Example of Reverse Charge System (VAT=19 percent) 
COMPANY A
Sells goods to Company B for €100. No VAT is charged. Submits to VAT office Reverse 
Charge Sales List (RCSL) of customers to whom sales without VAT have been made.
COMPANY B
Reverse charges himself VAT on purchase price of €100, declaring €19 payable to VAT 
authorities on the VAT return. Reclaims input VAT of €19 on the same VAT return. No net 
VAT is due. Sells to Company C for €150. No VAT is charged. Submits RCSL to VAT office.
COMPANY C
Reverse charges itself VAT on purchase price of €150, declaring €28.50 payable to VAT 
authorities on the VAT return. Reclaims input VAT of €28.50 on the same VAT return. Sells 
to final consumer for €200 plus €38 VAT. Output VAT of €38 declared on VAT return and 
paid to VAT authorities.
VAT OFFICE
Rather than receiving a proportion of the VAT due at each point in the supply chain 
(fractional payment system), the VAT authorities receive the amount due of €38 in one 
sum from Company C, once the goods are sold to the final consumer.
 
Source: Adapted from UK House of Lords (2007). 
 
Germany and Austria have asked the European Commission to evaluate their reverse charge 
proposals for transactions above €5.000 and €10.000, respectively (European Commission, 
2006).
68 The normal charge and tax credit rules would continue to apply to smaller (cash) 
transactions and to transactions where the status of the purchaser can not be properly verified. 
Clearly, this would put a heavy burden on suppliers who would first have to verify that their 
customers are registered persons qualifying for application of the reverse charge, and, 
subsequently, whether the amount of the transaction is less than €5.000/€10.000 (in which case 
VAT would be charged and subsequently creditable) or more than €5.000/€10.000 (in which 
case the customer would account for VAT and be eligible for the tax credit). 
2.6.2  Reverse charging vs. VAT 
Apart from the proposed thresholds, the most important difference between the EU VAT and a 
comprehensive reverse charging system is the way in which the tax is collected by the tax 
authorities – in full from the retailer under reverse charging but fractionally throughout the 
production-distribution process under the VAT. The choice, therefore, largely involves 
administrative and technical considerations. 
 
 
68 In addition, the EU’s ECOFIN Council has expressed the wish to explore the potential effects of an optional reverse-
charge mechanism by means of a pilot project (Press Releases, 2007). THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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The European Commission (2008, pp. 22-23) believes that reverse charging would increase the 
incidence of fraud at the retail level, the abuse and hijacking of VAT identification numbers, the 
creation of fake invoices, the replication of MTIC patterns on the domestic scene, and black 
market activity. In addition, transactions would be artificially split to circumvent the threshold. 
Generally, the lower the amount of the threshold, the more the level of reverse-charge fraud 
would increase (the opposite applies to VAT credit fraud). The weight of tax compliance and 
enforcement would fall fully on the retail sector, generally the weakest link in the VAT 
collection chain. By contrast, according to a common rule of thumb, 80 percent of VAT is 
remitted by less than 20 percent of all taxable persons.  
 
These observations are supported in the tax literature (Cnossen, 1987). In legal terms, the 
multistage collection feature of the VAT, in contrast to the single-stage collection feature of 
reverse charging, gives the tax authorities a lien, as it were, on suppliers for the tax payable by 
the retailer. Manufacturers and wholesalers have, in effect, been made tax collectors on behalf 
of the government – they remit part of the tax paid to them by retailers, namely that part that 
corresponds to their value added in the consumer product’s price times the VAT rate. 
Presumably, the rationale of this arrangement is that taxable retailers are less likely to default on 
tax invoiced by their suppliers than on tax payable directly to the tax authorities as is the case 
under reverse charging. 
 
Furthermore, the multistage collection feature under the VAT transfers part of the onus of proof 
regarding the tax liability to the taxpayer, whereas under reverse charging the onus rests fully 
with the tax authorities. A basic tax law rule, namely, is that for positive items – sales – the 
burden of proof lies with the tax office; it must prove that a business liable to tax has 
understated its sales. In this respect, reverse charging and VAT are similar. But for negative 
items, such as tax credits claimed under the VAT on the strength of purchase invoices, the onus 
probandi lies with the taxpayer, who must prove, to the satisfaction of the tax authorities, that 
he is entitled to the tax credits shown in his return because the goods and services purchased 
have been used in the course of the business.  
 
Beyond this, under reverse charging, vendors have to verify the status of buyers purchasing for 
resale or business use, in contrast to the VAT where the rule is that tax should always be 
charged. Accordingly, buyers can pretend to be registered firms and present fake identification 
numbers, asking the seller to send the goods to another address than shown on the online 
verification site. Because cheating a vendor, without doing him economic harm, presumably is 
less difficult than cheating the government, reverse charging places a lower price on dishonesty 
than the VAT.  
 
The question of whether or not tax should be charged is particularly problematic with dual-use 
goods and services (usable for business as well as personal purposes). Purchase by a legitimate     THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL 
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business would subsequently require that the VAT should be self-assessed if the goods or 
services are used for personal purposes. Similar problems arise with consumption “through the 
business.” A VAT denies the tax credit for purchases of food products, beverages, employee 
fringe benefits, and personnel transportation, even if made for business purposes, say, to 
entertain clients. Likewise, reverse charging would have to ensure that consumption items 
bought free of tax are not diverted to personal use without payment of tax. A VAT seems better 
placed to tax these goods, because evading the tax requires taxpayers to fraudulently claim a tax 
credit. Reverse charging, on the other hand, induces them simply to “forget” that tax should 
have been self-assessed.  
 
Finally, under a VAT, intermediate traders have an incentive to join the system; under reverse 
charging, they might want to opt out of the system. In sum, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that generalized reverse charging would throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
2.6.3  Universal cross-checking and VAT bank accounts 
According to the Commission, the proper enforcement of reverse charging would largely 
depend on the level of the additional reporting obligations that would have to be imposed, 
particularly the detailed monthly listings of transactions subject to reverse charging as well as 
transactions subject to the normal VAT (European Commission, 2008, p. 47). The levels of 
additional reporting range from no listing of transactions to global listing to transactions-based 
listing for both suppliers and/or purchasers. The matrix in table 2.4 shows the extent to which 
these obligations would allegedly enable the VAT authorities to cross-check taxable 
transactions and pinpoint the source of any mismatch. 
 
In theory, online transaction-based reporting by both supplier and purchaser (the last horizontal 
and vertical columns in table 2.4) should enable the VAT administration to cross-check all sales 
and purchase invoices, and this requirement is at the heart of the German proposal. As argued 
above, the experience of Korea and China indicates that large-scale transaction matching 
generates considerable unproductive work and greatly increases administrative and compliance 
costs. According to Gebauer, Nam, and Parsche (2007, pp. 11-12), the one-off costs of 
operating the German scheme in the first year of operation would increase by approximately 
one-fourth, in addition to the annual increase in operational costs. Furthermore, the system 
would have to be introduced on an EU-wide basis if businesses engaged in cross-border trade 
would not have to face different tax systems.  THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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No additional reporting 
obligations 
Global listing: VAT 
number of supplier + 
global value of 
purchases 
Transaction-based 
listing: VAT number of 
supplier + amount of 
each transaction 
       
No additional reporting obligations   Normal audit; no verification 
of transactions 
   
       
Global listing: VAT number of 
purchaser + global value of supplies 
Rudimentary cross-check; 
indication of mismatch but 
not source 
Cross-check; indication 
of source of mismatch 
 
       
Transaction-based listing: VAT 
number of purchaser + amount of 
each transaction 
Rudimentary cross-check   Full cross-check; 
indication of mismatch 
Exhaustive cross-
checking; clear 
indication of mismatch 
       
Source: Author’s compilation based on European Commission (2008).  
 
The complex monitoring mechanism under reverse-charging resembles the system of VAT 
bank accounts for ensuring VAT compliance. Such accounts used to be required in Bulgaria, 
but had to be abolished upon its accession to the EU (Harrison and Krelove, 2005, pp. 31-33). 
The mechanism obliges each VAT-registered person to open at least one VAT account into 
which customers must pay the VAT charged to them by their suppliers. In turn, suppliers use 
the deposits to meet their VAT liabilities to the government. No credit can be taken for VAT 
not paid into a bank account. Harrison and Krelove (2005, p. 32) conclude that the scheme by 
itself does not detect the usual forms of VAT fraud, that is, underreporting, false invoicing, 
transactions occurring outside the VAT system, and the like. Hence, it is not a panacea against 
VAT fraud. Compliance costs, moreover, are considerable. In fact, two VATs must be 
administered in tandem: one based on cash accounting and one on accrual accounting. 
2.6.4  Conclusion 
Comprehensive reverse charging, like exporter rating, is a system change that does nothing to 
improve the verification and audit of existing VATs. Apparently, proponents of reverse 
charging have an ineradicable belief in the efficacy of cross-checking with respect to domestic 
as well as cross-border transactions. This flies in the face of an old military adage that holds that 
an obstacle not covered by fire is no obstacle to the enemy. In VAT jargon: the introduction of 
Stasi-like, highly intrusive, and costly extensive listing requirements are no substitute for 
comprehensive audit.      SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
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2.7  Summary of findings 
What lessons do this review and evaluation of EU tax coordination issues have for other 
common markets and federations, such as the U.S.? 
 
Firstly, a VAT is superior to an RST in including most consumer goods and services in the base 
and in excluding most producer goods. Accordingly, a VAT is a more neutral consumption tax 
and does a better job in effecting correct BTAs. 
 
Secondly, the EU experience shows that VATs along with destination-based BTAs can be 
administered successfully in common markets without border controls and, by extension, in 
single domestic markets, such as the U.S. The replacement of deferred payment by some 
exporter rating scheme is not necessary, and would not solve the problem of cross-border fraud. 
 
Thirdly, to control cross-border fraud, the focus should be on effective cross-border audit, 
which extends the jurisdictional span of control of each state’s VAT administration. Undue 
reliance should not be placed on extensive transaction-specific cross-border information 
exchange systems, which are prone to error and largely unproductive. 
 
Fourthly, to allocate taxing rights properly in a common market or federation, it is important to 
define the place of supply precisely, especially with respect to services. B2B services should be 
taxed in the destination state and B2C services in the origin state (which generally is also the 
destination state). This distinction is best made by the kind of service supplied backed up by the 
VAT registration number or a general taxpayer identification number issued for, say, income 
tax purposes. Hence, it would not be necessary to issue VAT registration numbers to out-of-
state buyers in non-VAT states. 
 
Fifthly, the existence of a (supra)national VAT would facilitate but is not a condition sine qua 
non for exercising compliance control over state or provincial VATs. In the U.S., for instance, 
the cross-border audit of state VATs could be carried out in conjunction with the IRS’s audit of 
the income taxes. This implies that state VATs could be administered successfully in a common 
market or federation where other states do not have VATs or instead have RSTs (and/or various 
local RSTs). 
 
These findings, strongly corroborated by Canadian experience, augur well for replacing state 
RSTs in the U.S. by state VATs with or without the umbrella of an overarching federal VAT. 
California here we come! THREE VAT STUDIES: VAT COORDINATION IN COMMON MARKETS AND FEDERATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
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3  Improving the VAT treatment of exempt immovable 
property in the European Union
69 
The treatment of immovable property is one of the most difficult issues under the VATs in the EU. Ideally, 
rents and rental values should be taxed just like other consumer goods and services, but doing so would 
present formidable practical difficulties. Under a second-best approach, the value of newly created 
property is taxed as a proxy for the exempt flow of building services. This implies, however, that future 
increases (and decreases) in the value of the exempt property are left out of the VAT base. To remedy this 
defect, this paper recommends the replacement of the current transfer/registration and stamp duties on the 
sale of immovable property, which are highly distortionary, by a VAT on the increase (decrease) realized 
at the time of sale. Beyond that, the various VATs can be improved by applying the standard rate to all 
transactions in or related to immovable property, except the sale of residential premises.  
3.1  Introduction and summary 
Most member states of the European Union (EU) levy value-added tax (VAT), transfer duty 
(also called registration duty), and often stamp duty on transactions in or related to immovable 
property. While VAT generally is neutral with respect to producer and consumer choices, 
transfer duty and stamp duty, on the other hand, can be likened to non-neutral cumulative 
turnover taxes whose burden increases capriciously the more often immovable property is sold. 
To remove these distortionary cascading effects, the paper recommends that the various transfer 
and stamp duties imposed on the selling price of immovable property should be converted into a 
new “transfer duty” on the value added (defined as the difference between selling and purchase 
price) of immovable property, residential or commercial, that is currently exempt, by law or by 
election. The remaining (conventional) stamp duties on immovable property (and other official 
acts and deeds) should be abolished.  
 
It is proposed to tax the increase (refund the tax related to the decrease) in the value of exempt 
immovable property upon sale (since VAT is a transactions tax) at the going rate at which 
newly created property is taxed. However, since sellers and buyers of exempt immovable 
property are not registered for VAT purposes in respect of that property, the transfer duty 
legislation should be retained (to avoid confusion with the main VAT) and its mechanism 
should continue to be linked to the immovable property registrar’s office (cadastre). This 
approach resembles the margin methods applied in connection with the VAT treatment of 
second-hand goods, such as cars and works of art. The proposal would promote the neutrality 
and equity of the EU VAT. 
 
69 This paper was presented at a conference on VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives, organized by the 
Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford University, and the Fiscal Institute, Tilburg University, held at Worcester College, 
Oxford, 15-16 April 2010, and issued in its Working Paper series. The paper has benefited from the report that the author 
(assisted by Gerhard Badenhorst) prepared for the Tax Policy Unit, National Treasury of South Africa, and the South African 
Revenue Service, titled VAT, Transfer Duty, and Stamp Duty on Fixed Property (June 2008). THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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If the margin scheme were adopted, the present and proposed application of VAT to 
transactions in immovable property can be summarized as follows.  
 
1.  Sales of immovable property between taxable persons are considered a “normal transaction,” 
that is, VAT is imposed by the seller and a tax credit is available to the buyer.  
2.  Sales of immovable property by taxable persons to non-taxable persons also attract VAT (which 
is included in the sale price) in the normal way, although the purchaser, not being a taxable 
person, cannot take credit for it.  
3.  Sales of immovable property by non-taxable persons to taxable persons attract VAT under the 
capital goods scheme, which entitles the buyer to a notional VAT credit if he or she opts for 
taxation.
70 
4.  Sales of immovable property by non-taxable persons to other non-taxable persons are subject to 
a “reformed” transfer duty, that is, a surrogate VAT, on the increase (decrease) in the value of 
the property. It is this reformed transfer duty that is the main subject of analysis in this paper. 
 
These transactions would all be subject to VAT and no other transactions taxes would apply, 
but the new approach would not preclude the (annual) taxation of the ownership or use of 
immovable property, or, for that matter, the imposition of net wealth, estate duty and gift tax. 
Last but not least, much can be done to improve the VAT treatment of other transactions 
relating to immovable property. First and foremost, it would be advisable to tax the lease and 
sale of all immovable property (except previously occupied residential property) as is done 
under modern VATs, rather than exempt their lease and sale (except if the property is newly 
created) as prescribed under the EU’s Common VAT Directive (Council Directive, 2006). 
Secondly, evasion and avoidance can be much reduced by the widest possible application of the 
standard rate to building land, construction, social housing, renovation and repair.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section dwells briefly on the 
theoretical underpinnings of the VAT treatment of immovable property and its second-best 
practical application. Next, the third section provides an overview of the various ways in which 
transactions in immovable property currently are taxed in the EU – under the VAT as well as 
under other taxes, duties and levies. Subsequently, the fourth section attempts to give hands and 
feet to the proposal for taxing the increase (decrease) in the value of used residential and 
exempt non-residential property under VAT. 
 
 
70 Under the capital goods scheme, adjustments are allowed to the initial amount of input tax claimed, which reflect 
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3.2  VAT treatment of exempt immovable property 
In considering the nexus between VAT, transfer duty and stamp duty, as well as any 
recommendations for change, it is necessary to dwell briefly on the nature and design of the 
VAT, particularly as it relates to immovable property.  
3.2.1  Theoretical considerations 
It is widely agreed that the VAT should not distort market-based producer and consumer 
choices. This goal is served best if the VAT is imposed on the widest possible range of goods 
and services that are used or consumed by businesses and individuals. Exemptions violate the 
logic and functionality of the VAT. They distort input choices and harm exports. As an in rem 
tax, furthermore, VAT is ill equipped to influence the overall tax/expenditure distribution 
pattern for which the income tax and social benefit schemes are better targeted instruments.  
 
These observations apply also to the VAT treatment of immovable property. All transactions in 
immovable property – land and buildings, residential or commercial, privately or publicly 
owned – should be included in the VAT base and taxed at the standard rate. This rate should 
apply to the construction, repair and maintenance, sale, lease or owner-occupancy of new and 
used immovable property. The VAT’s tax credit mechanism should be relied upon to ensure 
that the VAT sticks only to consumer or end use of the services provided by immovable 
property, not to business use.  
 
To elucidate the underpinnings of the correct VAT treatment of immovable property, it is 
instructive to view land and buildings as stocks that can be used for consumption or production 
purposes (Cnossen, 1996). If immovable property, such as a factory building, is used for 
production purposes, the services that it generates should not be subject to VAT. Normally, the 
value of these services will be incorporated in the price of production that, if sold, would be 
subject to VAT. Moreover, any VAT paid at the time of the purchase of the building should be 
creditable against the VAT chargeable on the products made by the factory situated on the 
property. If there is no VAT on sales, simply because there are no sales, a refund would be due. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the same treatment should be accorded immovable property 
that generates housing services. The theoretically most attractive solution would be to register 
all persons, natural as well as legal, who own or buy residential immovable property for VAT 
purposes. By purchasing a house or an apartment, these persons would become producers 
(called taxable persons under VAT legislation) of housing services. In their role as producers, 
they would subsequently sell the housing services to consumers. These consumers could be 
lessees who buy the services for consideration, that is, a rental charge, but it is also possible that 
the producers would put the dwelling at their own disposal. In other words, as owner-occupiers, 
they would “sell” the housing services to themselves in their role as occupier-consumers.  THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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The VAT consequences of these events are obvious. The taxable person who buys a bundle of 
housing services in the form of a dwelling pays VAT on the purchase price, but at the same 
time, he is entitled to a tax credit (and refund, if due) for the same amount. If he sells the 
housing services to a lessee, he would have to charge VAT on the amount of the rental. The 
lessee, being a non-taxable consumer, would not be able to pass the VAT on; he would be stuck 
with it just like consumers of other services and goods. Similarly, in his role as owner-occupier, 
the producer of housing services would “charge” VAT on these services, whose value equals 
the rental value of the dwelling, rendered to himself as consumer. And like the lesser, he would 
have to remit that VAT (net of any VAT on inputs, such as repair and maintenance services) to 
the VAT authorities. And just like the lessee, he would be stuck with the VAT on the rental 
value of his dwelling. 
 
In short, under a pure theoretical VAT, immovable property would always be a producer 
good.
71 Sales, rentals and rental values, would be taxable and a credit would be available for the 
VAT on purchase. The treatment of land would not differ from the treatment of buildings. If 
land generates production services, as in agriculture, it should be treated in the same manner as 
the factory above. If it is a producer good that generates consumption services because it is used 
for camping or hunting purposes, then the same reasoning holds as given above in respect of 
housing services. Feasibility considerations may dictate other solutions, but it seems incorrect to 
say that land should be left out of the base because it is not a consumer good. The issue is 
whether land generates (on balance, non-taxable) production services, or (in principle, taxable) 
consumption services. 
3.2.2  Practical observations 
In practice, the registration for VAT purposes of all owner-occupiers and the computation of all 
rental values would present formidable administrative (and political) difficulties that a VAT 
should not take on. But if rental values cannot be taxed, the taxation of rental charges would 
appear to favour owner-occupiers over lessees. Also, the practical problems of taxing small 
landlords might be severe. As a second-best approach, therefore, all countries with a VAT 
exempt rental values and nearly all countries rental charges as well. Instead, these countries tax 
new residential construction. But since the purchase price of a dwelling may be taken to 
represent the present discounted value of its future services, by extension the VAT on the 
purchase price may be considered a good proxy for the discounted value of the VAT that should 
have been levied on the flow of housing services. Thus, owners and lessors of dwellings are 
indirectly subject to VAT on the consumption of housing services by themselves or by lessees. 
 
The equivalence between a VAT on rents and rental values and the “prepayment” of the same 
amount of tax through a VAT on the value of newly constructed (non-) residential premises, as 
 
71 Accordingly, it does not seem useful to view immovable residential property as a combination of a consumption good and 
an investment good. See Conrad and Grozav (2008).     VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
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well as the subsequent exemption of rents or rental values is illustrated in table 3.1. Working 
our way through the example, the value of the newly constructed dwelling is (for ease of 
calculation) supposed to be €2000, which attracts VAT at 20% or €400, invoiced to the 
purchaser and payable by the seller to the VAT authorities. However, since the buyer is subject 
to VAT on the rent that the dwelling fetches or the rental value if he “lets” the dwelling to 
himself, he is eligible for a tax credit of the same amount. Accordingly, his net VAT liability at 
the time of purchase in year 0 is nil.  
Table 3.1  Equivalence of taxation and exemption of rents and rental values 
Assumptions: : acquisition price of building = €2.000; straight line depreciation (40 years) = 5%; rate of return = discount 
rate = 10 percent; VAT = 20 percent 
             
Years  0  1  2  3-38  39  40 
           
A. VAT on rents and rental values           
VAT on building  400           
Input tax credit  −  400           
Rents/rental values    250  245  ....  60  55 
VAT on rents/rental values    50  49  ....  12  11 
Total VAT  0  50  49  ....  12  11 
PDV of VAT  400           
             
B. No VAT on rents and rental values           
VAT on building  400  -  -       
Input tax credit  0  0  -       
Rents/rental values    250  245  ....  60  55 
VAT on rents/rental values    0  0  0  0  0 
Total VAT  400  0  0  0  0  0 
PDV of VAT  400           
 
Furthermore, in year 1, the rent or rental value can be calculated as the sum of the depreciation 
in that year, that is, €50, plus the return on the investment, that is, 10% of €2.000, for a total of 
€250. Similarly, in year 2, the return is €50 plus 10% of the remaining investment of €1950, 
that is, €195, for a total of €245, and so on for the remainder of the lifetime of the building. As 
shown, in years 39 and 40 (when the building is fully written down) the rents or rental values 
can be calculated at €60 and €55, respectively. The VAT collected on these rents or rental 
values in years 1 and 2 is €50 and €49, respectively, and €12 and €11 in years 39 and 40. The 
present discounted value of the sum of these VATs on all rents or rental values equals €400, the 
same amount of VAT that was charged on the sale of the dwelling but that was washed out 
through the tax credit mechanism.  
 
The calculation is much simpler when the dwelling is taxed but rents or rental values are 
exempt. In this case, VAT is charged on the sale of the dwelling (charged to the buyer, but 
invoiced by the seller), while rents or rental values are not subject to VAT. The amount of VAT THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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remitted to the tax office is €400, exactly the same as the present discounted value of the VAT 
collected in years 1 through 40 on the taxable rent or rental value. 
3.2.3  Putting the equivalence notion into practice 
This is a neat result, which shows that the exemption of lessees (and landlords) and owner-
occupiers does not favour housing services over the consumption of other goods and services. It 
debunks the notion that housing services are not taxed, because their current use is exempted. 
Two approaches can be used to put the equivalence notion into practice: the exemption method 
and the tax method.  
 
Under the exemption method, prescribed in the EU’s Directive on the common Value added tax 
(Council Directive, 2006), the sale, lease and use of immovable property (residential and non-
residential) is, in principle, exempt, but newly constructed buildings, as well as alterations and 
maintenance of the existing building stock, are taxable without credit for tax. The exemption 
method needs a definition of specified non-residential use, such as hotel accommodation, 
boarding houses, camping facilities and parking space – all of which are taxable. Furthermore, 
since the business use and sale of existing non-residential immovable property also are exempt, 
an opportunity for optional registration and payment of VAT is desirable to avoid potential 
discrimination and cascading of tax.  
 
Under the tax method, the sale and lease of all immovable property is, in principle, taxable, but 
residential rents (and rental values) are exempt (or outside the scope of the VAT), as is the sale 
of previously occupied residential property (unless sold by a taxable person). This implies that 
the construction, sale, lease, alteration, and maintenance of all non-residential buildings are 
taxable. Sales of existing buildings also are taxable, unless such buildings constitute residential 
property. The tax method requires a definition of residential use (but not of specified non-
residential use, unless taxed differentially lower or higher), but optional registration and 
payment of VAT for commercial purposes does not have to be provided. 
 
Relative latecomers to the VAT, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa 
have chosen the tax method for the treatment of immovable property. This method seems 
superior to the exemption approach on the philosophy that exceptions to the first-best VAT 
treatment of immovable property should be formulated restrictively. The tax method does this 
by including changes in non-residential property values in the VAT base (if the property is used 
for taxable purposes), while the exemption method does not do so if no use is made of the 
registration option.     VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
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Since the reach of the tax method is greater than the reach of the exemption method, it results in 
more even-handed and neutral treatment.
72 
 
Both methods must address the VAT implications of the supply of land, which is traded even 
less often than buildings are and is used more often for productive purposes in exempt sectors. 
The EU’s 2006 Directive and Canada exempt all land, except building sites. New Zealand, on 
the other hand, taxes land as a second-hand good.
73 Similarly, Australia taxes land under a 
modified margin scheme (see below). The VAT treatment of land is closely tied in with the 
treatment of the agricultural sector. If agricultural activities are exempt, as is the case in the EU, 
it seems to make sense to exempt land as well. If not, the case for including land in the VAT 
base is strong.  
 
Neither the tax method nor the exemption method includes changes in residential and exempt 
non-residential property values in the VAT base. Implicitly, it is assumed that the rate of return 
(also the discount rate) does not change over the lifetime of the immovable property. Obviously, 
this is not a realistic assumption. Property values rise and decline with implications for the level 
of rents and rental values and, by extension, the VAT that, in theory, should be payable on the 
current use of building services.  
3.2.4  Conclusions 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the second-best VAT treatment of 
immovable property, which can serve as guidelines for practical policy action. 
 
1.  The taxation of newly created immovable property is a good but still second-best substitute for 
the exemption of rents and rental values, because the approach cannot take account of future 
changes in property values.
74 
2.  On the philosophy that, basically, VAT should tax all goods and services and that exceptions to 
this rule should be interpreted restrictively, taxing all immovable property except residential 
property is a broader and therefore better approach than exempting all immovable property 
(residential as well as non-residential), except newly constructed property.  
3.  Equal treatment of taxed and non-taxable property requires the imposition of a surrogate VAT 
on transactions in exempt properties between non-taxable persons. The base of this VAT should 
be defined as the difference between the selling price and the purchase price of the property (net 
of, ideally, the cost of any subsequent alterations, which have been subject to VAT).  
 
72 Administratively, however, the tax method is more likely to involve contentious issues about splitting property into 
residential and non-residential use (for instance, a lawyer having an office at his home), which would occur less often under 
the exemption method. However, as in Canada, income tax rules can be used to solve most problems. 
73   For the taxation of land in New Zealand, see Harley (2007), and for the treatment of immovable property, Smith (2008). 
The Australian’s GST treatment of immovable property is reviewed by Evans (2007). 
74 Also, it discriminates in favour of property existing before the introduction of VAT, if the pre-VAT tax burden on that 
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3.3  Actual VAT treatment of immovable property 
Prima facie, the VAT treatment of immovable property in the European Union, highly complex 
and often obscure, does not easily fit the second-best theoretical framework developed above. 
This section summarizes the EU rules, as laid down in the 2006 Directive, and reviews the 
practice in the various member states. Additional or alternative taxes, duties and levies on 
immovable property transfers also are examined. 
3.3.1  Common rules  
The 2006 Common VAT Directive provides the following rules on the treatment of immovable 
property (Articles refer to Council Directive, 2006). 
 
•  The supply of land is exempt (Article 135(1)(k)), except building land (Article 12(1)(b)). 
•  Building materials, repair, maintenance and construction services are subject to VAT (Articles 
14 and 24). 
•  New buildings (generally, before first occupation) together with the land on which they stand, 
are taxable (Article 12(1)(a)). Buildings are defined as including any structure immovable to or 
in the ground. 
•  Leasing and letting of used immovable property is exempt (Article 135(1)(l)), except hotel and 
holiday camping accommodation, parking facilities, permanently installed equipment and 
machinery (immovable by destination), and the hire of safes (Article 135(2)). 
•  The sale of used immovable property is exempt (see above), but taxable persons are allowed an 
option to be taxed (Article 137(1)(b-d)). The transfer of property as part of a going concern can 
be effected VAT free (Article 19).  
•  Input tax on property expenditure should be adjusted over a period of 5-20 years under the 
Capital Goods Scheme (CGS) when the property becomes taxable (Article 187). 
 
3.3.2  Member state practices 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the VAT treatment of the construction, lease and sale of new 
and used property in the 27 member states of the EU (column 1).
75 Few member states apply the 
standard VAT rate (column 2) without further ado. Clearly, there is substantial variation 
(allowed under discretionary or transitional rules or by way of derogation) between member 
states, mainly because of historic, legal, budgetary or intergovernmental tax assignment reasons 
and the interaction with transfer and stamp duties. Perhaps the best way to try to get a grip on 
what is going on is to review the process of the creation of new buildings (starting with building 
land and construction work), move on to social housing and renovation and repair, and from 
there to leasing and letting, and the sale of used property. Along the way, the major VAT 
aspects in the various member states are noted.  
 
75 For an out-of-date but still interesting survey, see Scammell and Ernst & Young (2003), and Scammell (2004).      ACTUAL VAT TREATMENT OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
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3.3.2.1  Building land and construction 
Non-building land is exempt in all member states, except Italy where its sale is exempt ‘with 
credit’ (that is, zero rated), so that taxable persons can recover related input tax. In contrast to 
the rule prescribed by the 2006 Common Directive, which suggests that building land should be 
taxed, 14 member states exempt building land along with other land (table 3.2, column 3). In 
Slovakia, building land is exempt, if unless it is supplied in connection with an exempt 
building. In Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, developers 
can opt for taxation, so that they can recover any VAT incurred in preparing building land for 
construction purposes.  
 
Construction work on new buildings (column 4) is taxed in all member states, although 10 
member states apply a lower rate if the work involves residential buildings (in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia this concession is due to expire at the end of 2010). In Luxembourg and 
Italy, the lower rate is confined to the principal dwelling – in other words, not to second homes, 
a provision whose compliance may be difficult to monitor. Ireland levies a lower than standard 
rate of 13.5% on all construction, whether residential or non-residential. Of course, in all 
member states, the VAT on construction work for new buildings, which are used for taxable 
purposes and for which the option of registration and taxation (if available) is being used, can 
be washed out through the tax credit mechanism. In Belgium, building work for a taxable 
person is subject to a reverse charge, which facilitates enforcement. 
 
It might be expected that the VAT treatment of new buildings (column 5), including the 
distinction between residential and non-residential buildings, would follow that of the VAT 
treatment of construction work on new buildings, but this is not always the case. In several 
countries, the supply of new buildings is exempt. In Finland and Sweden, the exemption implies 
full taxation, because developers have to pay the full VAT on the “self-supply” of buildings 
(with credit for input tax) before they can sell them. In Denmark, the purchaser takes on 
responsibility for the developer’s input tax under the capital goods scheme. In the UK, new 
buildings are only taxed if sold freehold; dwellings attract a zero rate. Some countries include 
rights in rem (rights falling short of outright possession, such as long leaseholds or rights as 
usufruct) in the VAT base. Various member states define reconstructed or renovated buildings 
as new buildings, so that they attract VAT. 
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Table 3.2  VAT treatment of immovable property in the European Union, 2010 
Member State  Standard rate   Construction, repair and maintenance                               
     (residential / non residential)                                            
    Building land  Construction work 
on new buildings 
 
New buildings 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
         
Austria  20  E  20  Eº 
Belgium  21  E  6 / 12 / 2021  21 
Bulgaria  20  20  20  20 
Cyprus  15  E  15  15 
Czech. Rep.  20  20  10* / 20  10* / 20 
Denmark  25  E  25  Eºº 
Estonia  20  20  20  20 
Finland  22  Eº  22  Eºº 
France  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6 
Germany  19  Eº  19  Eº 
Greece  19  E  19  19 
Hungary  25  25  25  25 
Ireland  21  E  13.5*  13.5* 
Italy  20  20  4* / 10   4* / 10 / 20 
Latvia  21  E  21  21* 
Lithuania  21  21  21  21 
Luxembourg  15  Eº  3* / 15  E 
Malta  18  E  18  E 
Netherlands  19  19  19  19 
Poland  22  22  7 / 22  7 / 22 
Portugal  20  Eº  5 / 20  Eº 
Romania  19  19  19  19 
Slovak. Rep.  19  19 / E*  19  19 
Slovenia  20  20  8.5* / 20  8.5* / 20 
Spain  16  16  4 / 7  7 / 16 
Sweden  25  E  25  Eºº 
United Kingdom  17.5  Eº / 17.5  17.5 / 0  0 / 17.5 
         
Notes: E = Exempt, but Eº indicates that developers can opt for taxation and Eºº that developers can recover input tax if the building is 
sold to a taxable person. In columns (8) and (9): T = taxable; ø = option for taxation by taxable persons. 
Sources: European Commission (2010) and “Taxes in Europe” database: Search Results, 2009; and country legislation. The table does 
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Table 3.2  VAT treatment of immovable property in the European Union, 2010 (continued) 
  Leasing and letting  Sale of used buildings  Comments                                
            (residential / non residential)                           *excl. mat. if lower rate applies 
Social housing  Renovation and 
repair* 
     
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
         
20  20  10 / E
ø  E
ø    
6 / 12  6* / 21  E / T  E
ø  *dwelling ≥5 yrs old 
20  20  E / T  E / T   
15  15  E  E   
10  10  E
ø  E  *until end 2010 
25  25  E
ø  E
ø   
20  20  E
ø  E
ø   
22  22  E
ø  E
ø   
5.5 / 19.6  5.5* / 19.6  E
ø / T  E  *private dwellings ≥2 yrs old 
19  19  E
ø  E
ø   
19 / E  9*/ 19  E / T  E  *old private dwellings;  
25  25  E
ø  E / T   
13.5  13.5*  E
ø  E  *parking rate 
4 / 10t  10  E
ø / T  E / T  *first housing 
21  21  E / T  E  *first supply 
21  21  E
ø  E
ø   
3* / 15  3* / 15  3 / E
ø  E
ø  *principal dwelling(or>20 yrs old) 
E  18  E / T  E   
19  6* / 19  E
ø  E
ø  *painting/plastering if >15 yrs old 
7  7  E / T  E / T   
E / 5  5 / 20  E
ø / T  E
ø   
19  19  E  E   
19  19  E
ø  E
ø  *if supplied with exempt building 
8.5  8.5  E
ø  E
ø  *until end 2010 
4 / 7l  4 / 7*  E / T  E
ø  *brick laying for repair dwellings 
25 / E  25  E
ø  E
ø   
17.5 / 0  17.5 / 5*  E
ø  E
ø  *Isle of Man 
 
In Austria, Denmark, Portugal and possibly some other member states too, developers incur 
cash-flow costs, because they cannot recover input tax until the time of sale of new buildings, 
although input tax can be recovered if the (non-residential) building is let to a taxable person. 
Conversely, cash-flow issues arise in Finland for developers who intend to let rather than sell. 
In most states, the rules for lettings and sales to exempt and partly exempt businesses create 
VAT costs, including costs for developers. 
 
Some member states, for example France and Spain, provide a concessionary VAT rate to 
social housing (column 6), lower than the reduced rate already applicable to new residential 
premises. Generally, social housing is defined as housing that is partially or wholly financed by 
government. Of course, this implies that the lower rate or the exemption can exactly be 
replicated by an adjustment of the subsidy. In other words, the exception for social housing is 
redundant, and may result in tax avoidance.  THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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Understandably, renovation and repair services (column 7) are more often taxed at the standard 
VAT rate than social housing or new buildings, because these services can be used for 
residential as well as non-residential purposes. Taxation at the standard rate without regard to 
end-use makes evasion more difficult. The reduced rate on renovation and repair services 
regarding old dwellings in Belgium, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain 
are an invitation to misclassify the end-use and evade VAT. 
Leasing and letting 
The letting of residential premises is exempt in all but two member states (column 8). 
Apparently, to achieve parity between ‘rooms for rent’ and hotel accommodation, Austria taxes 
lettings at 10 percent and Luxembourg at 3 percent. Leasing and letting of non-residential 
buildings also are exempt under the 2006 Common Directive, but 10 member states tax leasing 
and letting, while nearly all of the other member states allow the option of registration and 
taxation. Some states do not have an option to tax, but the exemption for non-residential 
buildings is so limited that the option would be redundant anyway. 
 
In Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Spain lettings of non-residential property usually are 
taxable. Greece and Italy tax the letting of a dwelling by a developer and France the letting of 
furnished or equipped business premises. Ireland taxes leases of 10 years or more at 13.5% on 
the agreed sum at the start of the lease. Malta taxes the lettings by a limited liability company to 
a taxable person, and Belgium finance leases of new buildings used for the taxable purposes of 
a business. 
Sales of used property 
Sales of used non-residential buildings are also exempt under the 2006 Common Directive. In 
Hungary, Italy and Poland, however, the exemption is very limited and never applies to 
business premises. In France, property sales by a property dealer (marchand de biens) are 
taxable, but usually only on the dealer’s margin.  
 
All countries, except Greece, Italy and five new accession states have an option to tax, although 
in Belgium it is of very limited application. Another four states only allow an option for leasing 
or letting, but not for sales, while in several countries the option is only available if the 
purchaser or tenant has a certain level of VAT recovery. In various member states, the wide-
ranging compulsory taxation of property transactions means that there is less need for an option. 
A disadvantage is sometimes that a taxable person or landlord cannot opt in advance, and so 
may not be able to recover input tax until a purchaser or tenant is found.  
 
Member states are required to adjust input tax on immovable property (and other capital goods) 
over a period of up to 20 years under the capital goods scheme. Most member states have a 10-
year period, but do not apply the adjustment to building work. Finland and Ireland do not permit     ACTUAL VAT TREATMENT OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
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adjustments, but their rules for new buildings deal with many of the same situations where a 
capital goods scheme might otherwise be applicable. 
Crazy quilt of taxation  
Most likely, there is less alignment in the treatment of immovable property and construction 
across the EU than in any other area of the EU VAT. In most member states, the best-practice 
rule that all transactions in or related to immovable property should be fully taxed at the 
standard rate is honoured only in the breach. Possible exceptions are Hungary and Poland, 
which are noteworthy for the limited scope of their exemptions for immovable property. Several 
infringements of the neutrality criterion can also be noted. As an example, the rules in Belgium 
militate against speculative development; renovation as opposed to major reconstruction; 
purchasing second-hand property (because of registration tax); purchasing new property to sell 
on or to let, other than under a finance lease; the disposal of surplus business premises; and the 
inter-company letting or sale of existing building (which are exempt with loss of input tax) 
(Scammell, 2004). 
 
The VAT treatment of transactions in immovable property in the EU would benefit from an 
examination of the approach found in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Australia taxes all 
immovable property transactions, except sales of used residential property (and rents and rental 
values). A zero rate is applied to farm land and land owned by a taxable person as part of a 
going concern. In some cases a reverse charge is applicable to purchasers of immovable 
property, which eliminates potential cash-flow problems. Canada’s federal GST treats 
immovable property in line with Australian practice. A similar approach is followed in New 
Zealand, which anticipated the VAT treatment found in Australia and Canada. 
3.3.3  Additional or alternative taxes 
All member states levy additional or alternative taxes on the sale or lease of new and used 
property, although the rationale for these taxes, which have not been harmonised, is weak. 
Table 3.3 provides an overview of their prevalence in the EU. Generally, revenues do not 
exceed 2% of total tax revenue, although Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom are notable exceptions. Often the 
revenues accrue to regional or local governments (last column of table 3.3), complicating 
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Table 3.3   Taxes on Transactions in Immovable Property in the European Union, 2009 
Member   English name  National name 
State     
     
Austria  Real estate transfer tax  Grunderwerbsteuer 
  Legal and administrative duties   Stempel- und Rechtsgebühren 
Belgium  Miscellaneous duties and taxes   Droits et taxes divers/Diverse rechten en taksen 
  Registration, mortgage and court rights  Droits d’enrigstrement, d’hypothèque et de greffe / Registratie-, 
hypotheek- en griffierechten  
Bulgaria  Taxes on acquisition of property   Данък при придобиване на имущества по дарение и по 
възмезден начин 
Cyprus  Lands and surveys taxes  Τέλη που επιβάλλονται кαι εισπράττονται από το Τ ή α 
Kτη ατολογίον και Xωρο ετρίας 
  Stamp duty   Τέλος Χαρτοσή ων 
Czech Rep.  Real estate transfer tax  Daň z převodu nemovitostí 
  Administrative fees  Správní poplatky 
  Fee on building land betterment  Poplatek za zhodnocení stavebního pozemku 
Denmark  Registration tax (stamp duty)  Afgift af tinglysning og registrering af ejerog pantrettigehder mv. 
  Property release duty (derestriction)  Frigørelseafgift på fast ejendom 
  Taxation of the sale of immovable property  Lov om beskatning af fortjeneste ved afståelse af fast ejendom 
Finland  Transfer tax   Variansiirtovero/ Överlåtelseskatt 
France  Principal registration duties  Principaux droits d’enregistrement 
Germany  Real property transfer tax  Grunderwerbsteuer 
Greece  Real estate transfer tax  Φόρος  εταβίβασης ακτυήτωυ 
  Stamp duties  Фορολογία χαρτοσή ου 
Hungary  Property transfer tax  Vissszterhes vagyonátruházási illeték 
Ireland  Stamp duty on property  Stamp duty on property 
Italy  Registration tax on property transfer  Imposta di registro 
  Mortgage tax and land registry tax  Imposte ipotecarie e catastali 
  Stamp duty  Imposta di bollo 
  Replacement tax  Imposta sostitutiva 
  Municipal tax on building licenses  Contributi concessioni edilizie 
Latvia  Duty for consolidation of ownership and legal 
liens in Land Register 
Nodeva par īpašuma itiesību un ėīlas tiesību nostiprināšanu 
zemesgrāmatā 
Luxembourg  Registration taxes  Droits d’enregistrement 
Malta  Duty on documents and transfers Immovables  Taxxa fuq Dokumenti u Trasferimenti - Immobili 
Netherlands  Tax on legal transactions  Belastingen van rechtsverkeer 
Poland  Tax on civil law transactions  Podatek od czynności cywilnoprawnych 
  Stamp duty  Oplata skarbowa 
Portugal  Immovable property municipal transfer tax  IMT - Imposta municipal sobre as transmissões onerosas de imóveis 
  Stamp duty  Imposto do selo 
Slovenia  Real property transactions tax   Zakon o davku na promet nepremičnin 
Spain  Tax on capital transfers and documented legal 
acts 
Impuesto sobre transmissiones partrimoniales y actos jurídicos 
documentados 
  Tax on construction, installation and works  Impuesto sobre Constructiones, Instalaciones y Obras 
  Tax on the increase in the value of urban land  Impuesto sobre Incremento del Valor de los Terrenos de Naturaleza 
Urbana 
Sweden  Stamp duty  Stämpelskatt 
UK  Stamp duty land tax  Stamp duty land tax 
 
Source: European Commission: “Taxes in Europe” database: Search Results, downloaded 9 April 2010. Taxes on ownership and/or use of immovable 
property found in all member states are not shown. Taxes on transfers by gift or at death and some other duties or levies covered by the legislation also 
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Table 3.3  Taxes on Transactions in Immovable Property in the European Union, 2009 (continued) 
Tax base or object  Most common rate(s)  Revenue yield 2007,% of  Beneficiary  
    Total tax  GDP  government 
         
Purchase price  3.5% (2% for relatives)  0.56  0.23  Central/Local 
Tenancy and loan agreements  Wide range of specific duties  0.70  0.29  Central 
Deeds drawn up by notaries and banks  €50 for notaries; €2 for mortgages  1.05  0.46  Central 
Contractual value 
 
10% (12.5% in Walloon Region)  2.33  1.02  Central/Regional 
Value assessed by Municipal Council 
 
1.3%-2.6%  1.63  0.55  Local 
Property value or amount of mortgage 
 
3%-8%; 1% on mortgage  1.54  0.64  Central 
Value of agreement or standard fee  1.5‰-2.0‰ or €34.17  1.11  0.46  Central 
Transfer price or officially assessed value  3%  0.76  0.28  Central 
Transfers and mortgage deeds  Wide range of specific duties  0.30  .011  Central/Local 
Difference in value before/after improvement  Per m
2 specified by municipality  0.00  0.00  Local 
Registration of ownership and mortgages  1,400 DKK+0.6% f sale p.(1.5% mortg)  1.04  0.50  Central 
Increase in value due to change in zoning  40% on DKK 200,000,60% on balance  0.00  0.00  Central/Local 
Sale price minus acquisition cost  Capital income tax rates  ..  ..  Central 
Transfer price  4%  0.90  0.38  Central 
Higher of price plus charges or market value  7.5%  1.24  0.53  Central/Reg./Local 
Amount of consideration  3.5%  0.72  0.28  Regional 
Contractual sale price  7%-9%  1.86  .059  Central/Local 
Dales, rents and loans  3%  0.95  0.30  Central 
Market value  10%  1.16  0.46  Central/Local 
Contractual consideration  0%-9% (over 1 million)  4.00  1.24  Central 
Market value or estimated rent  0.5%-15% (first house: 3%)  0.97  0.41  Central/regional 
Amount of mortgage or value of property   Cadastre:1%, mortg.:0.5%-3% or €168  0.38  0.16  Central/regional 
Deeds and documents  Most common: €14.62  0.79  0.34  Central/Reg./Local 
Amount of mortgage  2%  0.44  0.19  Central 
Amount of building cost and town planning  ..  0.51  0.22  Local 
Property value or amount of loan agreement 
 
2% subject to ceiling of LVL30,000  1.20  0.36  Central 
Market value  6%  7.45  2.72  Central 
Market value  3.5% (5% for non-residential property)  3.60  1.25  Central 
Market value  6%  2.62  1.02  Central 
Market value or amount of mortgage  2% or 0.1%  0.64  0.22  Local 
Type of document  Specific  0.16  0.05  Local 
Higher of contractual price or taxable value  Rural: 5%; Urban: 0%-8%  1.54  0.56  Local 
Higher of contractual price or taxable value  0.8%  3.01  1.10  Central 
Selling price  2%  0.43  0.16  Local 
Market value 
 
6%; deeds: specific  4.46  1.65  Regional 
Value of construction, installation or work  2.4%-4%  0.49  0.18  Local 
Increase in value upon sale 
 
Up to 30%  0.36  0.13  Local 
Price of property or amount of mortgage  1.5% or 2%  0.63  0.30  Central 
Consideration for chargeable interest  1%-4% on sale and 1% on rent  2.03  0.74  Central 
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Overview 
Generally, the taxes shown in table 3.3 go by the name of transfer duty, registration duty or 
stamp duty.
76 The difference between transfer duty and registration duty tends to be one of 
name only. Both are levied on the sale price agreed to between the parties to the transaction or 
on the fair market value. The same applies to the lands and surveys taxes in Cyprus and the tax 
on legal (civil law) transactions in the Netherlands and Poland. Interestingly, various member 
states levy tax on new mortgages, which can be viewed as a proxy for the tax on the property 
which serves as collateral.  
 
Various member states prevent the simultaneous application of VAT and transfer duty. In 
Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, for instance, transfer duty does not apply if the 
property transaction is subject to VAT. In Belgium, the registration tax is reduced to a nominal 
amount if VAT applies, but in the absence of a general option to tax, most sales are subject to 
higher rates of registration tax. Property sales in Italy are subject to high transfer taxes, which 
are reduced to a nominal sum if the sale is also subject to VAT. In Luxembourg, sales are 
subject to transfer tax of 7-10% whether or not they are also subject to VAT. This creates 
substantial tax costs, including for developers. In Spain, sales in exercise of an option under a 
finance lease are taxable, which creates costs for tenants who are not fully taxable. In Sweden, 
developers incur cash flow problems, if they let (adjustments under capital goods scheme) 
rather than sell property. In France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, the application 
of the VAT means that the sale of building land is not subject to transfer duty or that it is taxed 
at a reduced rate. This may be advantageous, since transfer duty, in contrast to VAT, is a non-
recoverable cost. 
 
Nine member states subject residential leases to registration tax or stamp duty. These countries 
are Austria (1%), Belgium (0.2%), France (2.5%), Greece (3.6%), Ireland (1%), Italy (2%), 
Luxembourg (0.6%), Spain (0.5%), and the UK (2%). Austria, Ireland, Spain and the UK apply 
these taxes also to leases of business premises. Portugal treats long leases as sales, subject to 
transfer tax. Usually, the basis of assessment is the total rents under the lease, but the UK and 
Ireland assess stamp duty on the annual rent. 
 
Of particular interest for the purpose of this paper are the various taxes levied on increases in 
property values. Denmark, for instance, imposes tax on the capital gain realized on the sale of 
immovable property. Although subject to capital income tax, the base of this tax is identical to 
the base under a VAT levied on the increase (decrease) in the value of exempt property. Also, 
Denmark imposes a “derestriction” tax on the gain in the value of property whose zoning 
 
76 Elsewhere, the Australian States impose stamp duty on the transfer of immovable property, differentiated by state, 
property category (principal residences may attract reduced rates) and purchase price. There is no link between the federal 
VAT and the state stamp duty. In Canada, most provinces impose land transfer taxes, often at graduated rates. New 
Zealand does not levy transfer or stamp duties that complicate the picture.     ACTUAL VAT TREATMENT OF IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
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designation changes from agricultural land to urban or cottage land, which implies permission 
to built up the land and hence a windfall gain. Similarly, Spain taxes the increase in the value of 
urban land, and Italy and Latvia have taxes that attempt to capture changes in value due to 
changes in the zoning designation of land.  
 
The conventional stamp duties on official documents related to transactions in immovable 
property (and various other dutiable events) are a separate category. Although the rates, often 
specified by type of event, tend to be low, these duties exhibit the same cascading effects as 
transfer duties, at least to the extent that they do not represent a consideration for services 
rendered by government. As table 3.3 shows, many member states still are enamoured by these 
anachronistic levies. 
Evaluation 
This brief overview shows that there seems to be little rhyme or reason to the additional or 
alternative taxes on property transactions in the EU. In Italy, duplication and non-transparency 
has reached such proportions that the government has legislated a replacement tax (see table 
3.3), purportedly in lieu of the registration duty, stamp duty, mortgage tax, cadastral tax and the 
duty on official concessions for medium- and long-term loans. Apparently, the duties that are 
supposed to be replaced are still being levied.  
 
Little, if anything, can be said in favour of the present transfer (or registration) duties, which act 
as cascading turnover taxes on property transactions. The more often a property is sold, the 
more often transfer duty has to be paid. Also, the transfer duty causes a locked-in effect, that is, 
owners will hang on to their property longer than they would if there had been no transfer duty. 
In economic terms, ownership preferences and risk profiles diverge, similar to a tax on capital 
gains, and residential mobility suffers. If possible, tax systems should avoid such effects; they 
are a deadweight loss to the economy. Also, there is an element of double taxation if VAT as 
well as transfer duty apply, for example in the case of a newly built dwelling (subject to VAT), 
which is subsequently sold by its occupant (subject to transfer duty). Further, no case can be 
made for levying transfer duty on commercial property transactions – final consumer 
expenditures should be taxed, not business inputs (unless externalities have to be accounted 
for).  
 
Generally, there seems to be little pressure for less complexity and greater neutrality in the 
member states with respect to the taxation of immovable property, perhaps because the taxes 
are “old” and the European Commission does not provide much guidance. Beyond that, there is 
the issue that the disparities in the tax treatment of immovable property may be mitigated (or 
compounded!) by differences in the price and availability of property, differences in land law, 
the nature and security of tenure, in planning regimes and grant funding, and other factors. In 
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immovable property is changed, all the other aspects should be changed, too. But even with this 
caveat in mind, there remains a case for improving the nexus between VAT and transfer duties 
to which I now turn. 
3.4  Improving the nexus between VAT and transfer duties 
It is suggested to adopt a two-pronged approach to promote greater rationality and neutrality in 
the taxation of immovable property transactions. First, the tax method should be adopted in the 
EU, that is, all transactions in or related to immovable property should be taxed, except rents 
and rental values and sales of residential and exempt non-residential property to non-taxable 
persons. This method is superior to the exemption method currently in use. The adoption of the 
tax method should be used to review the rationality of the disparities within member states 
shown in table 3.2.  
 
Secondly, the increase (decrease) in the value of exempt property, residential and non-
residential, realized upon sale, should be brought into the VAT base. Importantly, if this margin 
scheme would be extended to all immovable property currently exempt in the EU, the explicit 
adoption of the tax method might not be necessary (although it would still be desirable to 
eliminate other disparities). Presumably, taxable persons then would more readily opt for 
registration and taxation which would automatically bring the increase (decrease) in the VAT 
base. Further, it is proposed to retain the transfer/registration duty collection mechanism for the 
margin scheme applied to transactions in exempt immovable property.  
3.4.1  Applying the margin scheme to transfers of exempt property 
Two situations can be distinguished in implementing the margin scheme for immovable 
property transactions in the VAT system: sales from non-taxable persons to taxable persons and 
sales from non-taxable persons to other non-taxable persons. No special consideration needs to 
be given to sales between taxable persons and by taxable persons to non-taxable persons, since 
the normal VAT regime applies. 
Sales from non-taxable persons to taxable persons 
The rationale for VAT schemes for second-hand goods is that their purchase and subsequent 
sale by taxable dealers, who would pay the full VAT on the sale price without any credit, would 
involve double taxation. After all, the VAT would be in addition to the old VAT for which no 
credit would be given. Thus, without good reason, the VAT would deter the re-use of goods and 
would divert the trade in second-hand goods to private channels. Accordingly, specialization 
would suffer. 
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In recognition of this fact, countries with sophisticated VAT systems allow taxable persons in 
second-hand goods a credit for the tax that may be assumed to be included in the purchase 
price. This credit can be given implicitly at the time of resale by applying the VAT to the 
difference between the selling price and the purchase price (second-hand goods method) or by 
allowing the tax credit immediately against sales at the time of purchase (margin scheme). 
Under the second-hand goods method, second-hand goods are not held VAT free by dealers, 
unlike other goods held in inventory. This violates VAT’s philosophy, because the dealers incur 
an interest cost on the VAT until the time that the second-hand goods are resold. In contrast to 
the second-hand goods method, no interest cost is incurred under the margin scheme. Moreover, 
like new goods, the tax credit is also available if the dealer decides to use the second-hand 
good, say, a truck, in his own business. 
 
In terms of technique, margin or second-hand goods methods do what they should do, that is, 
eliminate double VAT, if second-hand goods have decreased in value while in the hands of non-
taxable persons. Double VAT is eliminated by allowing the taxable purchaser a notional credit 
for the VAT (t) deemed to be still included in the purchase price, which can be calculated at 
t/(1+t) of that price. Without a cap to the credit, however, more than the original VAT would be 
eliminated if the second-hand good had increased in value. Accordingly, the tax credit should 
be limited to the tax calculated on the purchase price or the selling price whichever is lower.  
 
Generally, the capital goods schemes in the various member states permit this treatment also to 
sales of immovable property by non-taxable persons to taxable persons in whose hands the 
property is not exempt.
77 This promotes neutrality, although the periods during which the 
schemes must be applied are rather short. 
Sales from non-taxable persons to other non-taxable persons 
Apart from the revenue it raises (an important consideration), the only rationale for levying 
transfer duty on immovable property transactions between non-taxable persons is that the duty 
resembles a poorly designed surrogate VAT on the increase in rents and rental values associated 
with increases in property values. These increases are left out of the VAT base due to the 
“prepayment” feature of the VAT on exempt building services. But if this is its rationale, the 
base of the transfer duty should be redefined as the difference between the selling price and the 
purchase price (or some proxy if information on the purchase price is not available) of 
immovable property traded between non-taxable persons. This difference, which reflects the 
present discounted value of the increase in building services since the acquisition of the exempt 
property, should be included in the VAT base and taxed at the standard rate, either at the level 
 
77 Theoretically, a credit should also be allowed for the non-creditable VAT paid by the non-taxable person on any repairs or 
alterations of the immovable property during the period in which he held the property. However, this may not be permitted for 
the obvious reason that it would be difficult to monitor the VAT paid in respect of repairs or alterations. The effect would be 
limited if major repairs and renovations are considered as supplies of new property. THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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of the seller or the buyer of the property through a reverse charge. This would eliminate the 
cascading effect of the present transfer duty, although the locked-in effect would remain.  
The margin scheme (to be distinguished from the second-hand goods method) for immovable 
property can be incorporated in the VAT (and the transfer duty abolished) or it might continue 
to be called transfer duty, while retaining the procedures (only for individuals and non-
registered entities) currently on the transfer duty statute. Since the new transfer duty should be 
levied in close cooperation with the administration of the immovable property registrar’s office, 
retention of the transfer/registration duty mechanism for assessing and collecting the new tax 
probably is to be preferred. Although de facto separate taxes, obviously the new transfer tax is a 
supplemental VAT.  
 
The major advantage of this approach is that it would achieve broad neutrality in the VAT cum 
(new) transfer duty treatment of taxable persons and non-taxable persons.
78 Basically, all 
transactions in immovable property between non-taxable persons should be subject to the 
reformed transfer duty, including those by or between governments and non-profit 
organisations. Also, the increase in value should be taxed if immovable property passes on to 
heirs and legatees. On feasibility grounds small value increases of, say, €25.000 or an amount 
which would mirror the current transfer duty exemption, might be exempted. The separate 
collection of the VAT on the margin (presumably over time confined to residential and non-
commercial property) would make it possible to cede the revenue to regional and local 
governments in lieu of the revenue from the old transfer, registration and/or stamp duties. 
Other issues 
An interesting issue is whether or not the new transfer duty should be refunded if the property is 
sold below its acquisition cost. In principle, the answer is affirmative. The future value of the 
housing services embodied in the property has declined and so has the value of future 
consumption. In practice, the refund issue is unlikely to occur, because as a cash-flow tax the 
VAT is based on nominal, not real values of properties actually sold. Since the new transfer tax 
would only apply to transactions between non-taxable persons, any application for a refund 
should attract the attention of the VAT authorities, which can then check suspicious 
transactions. 
 
Another issue which may be raised is whether the redesigned transfer duty resembles a capital 
gains tax. The answer is an unqualified “no”. Although the two taxes are imposed on the same 
base, that is, the difference between the sale price and the acquisition price, the new transfer 
 
78 Of course, the VAT credit (calculated on the original acquisition price) allowed to a taxable person buying immovable 
property from a non-taxable person might have to be calculated on the basis of a price before the introduction of the VAT, 
but this may be acceptable on the philosophy that the previous sales tax also applied to construction and because of the 
enormous increases in property values. Australia introduced a margin scheme to ensure that only post-GST (=VAT) 
increases in the value of immovable property would be subject to GST. See Australian Government (2010), and C. Peacock 
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duty is a tax on consumption, whereas the capital gains tax is a tax on income. By analogy, the 
taxpayer whose gross earnings are subject to income tax and whose earnings after tax, which he 
spends, are subject to VAT, pays two taxes but is not doubly taxed.
79  
 
In considering the difference between a realized capital gain and an increase in value added, it 
may be pointed out that a taxable capital gain represents an ex-post adjustment for past accruals 
of income. Ideally, the tax should be imposed as the gain accrues rather than upon realization. 
Accordingly, it would be appropriate to levy interest on the tax on the realized capital gain over 
the period during which the gain accrued. By contrast, the VAT on the increase in value added 
should be considered an ex-ante adjustment of the discounted present value of future housing 
services. Interest or indexing arrangements would, therefore, seem inappropriate. True, the 
owner-occupier of housing services, whose present value has increased, has benefited from not 
having had to pay more VAT after he bought the dwelling, but this fortuitous result is inherent 
to a cash-flow consumption tax under which the VAT on durable consumer goods is prepaid 
rather than imposed as the services of the durable goods are consumed. 
3.4.2  Abolition of stamp duties 
What to do with stamp duties, which are not another name for transfer or registration duties, as 
in Ireland and the UK? The answer is simple: abolish them. Generally, conventional stamp 
duties regardless of on what legal documents (deeds, bills of exchange, bonds, leases, 
marketable securities, and the like) they are imposed are archaic levies, which resemble 
distortionary, cumulative turnover taxes whose cumbersome administration may well cost more 
than the revenue collected. Often the duties can be avoided by changing the form in which 
business is conducted. Evasion is possible by misstating values, by using fake stamps or none at 
all, particularly on small transactions.  
 
This applies also to stamp duties on leases and/or sales of residential and commercial 
immovable property, which, as argued above, cannot be rationalized as surrogate VATs on the 
increase in the value of building services not included in the base of the prepaid VAT. Further, 
the stamp duty is a poor proxy for government services rendered in the form of roads, sewage 
services, etc. If government provides services that benefit residents and businesses, direct 
payments should be preferred or payments based on a close proxy for the services rendered, 
such as municipal property rates.
80  
 
79 Even the amount of the tax is the same if the income tax rate is expressed as a percentage of income excluding tax, or 
the VAT rate as a percentage of consumption including VAT. The formula ti  = te (1 – ti ) can be used to convert a tax-
inclusive rate, ti, into a tax-exclusive rate, te. 
80 A fairly recent study carried out in Australia (Property Council of Australia, 2003) stated that the abolition of stamp duty on 
leases would deliver the following benefits: directly reduce the tax burden on businesses, large and small; reduce the cost of 
leasing space for business tenants; remove a complicated, onerous tax; remove the uncertainty associated with basing 
lease duty on forward estimates of rental flows, including the impact of rent reviews that would take place in unknown future 
circumstances; and remove the reliance on a tax that fluctuates with the property market. THREE VAT STUDIES: IMPROVING THE VAT TREATMENT OF EXEMPT IMMOVABLE PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
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In the member states of the European Union, the complete abolition of the remaining stamp 
duties on immovable property, no doubt, would be welcomed by the business community and 
show the country that governments are not only interested in levying “more taxes,” but also in 
rationalizing the existing tax system by weeding out nuisance levies. Part of the loss in revenue 
(very little) would be compensated by an increase in income tax receipts, because the stamp 
duty would not anymore figure as a deductible cost in ascertaining taxable profits.  
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  The European Commission has issued a Green Paper on the future of VAT. It be 
lieves that the Member States should strive towards simpler, more robust and 
e    cient VAT systems. The common VAT is distortionary, unnecessarily complex, 
and susceptible to fraud. Base broadening, rate uni   cation, and improvements 
in VAT coordination should be on the tax reform agendas of the Member States. 
The Commission invites submissions on a wide range of topics.
This volume contains three studies on the EU VAT. The    rst study aims at improv 
ing the understanding and dialogue on the VAT between lawyers, economists, 
and accountants. The second study analyses VAT fraud, particularly carousel 
fraud, evaluates various proposals that have been made to replace the current 
transitional regime by a de   nitive regime under which intracommunity supplies 
would be taxed in conjunction with a credit in the state of acquisition, and rev 
enue clearing between supply and acquisition states. The study argues that it 
is not the break in the VAT collection chain (the zero rating of intracommunity 
supplies) that is at the root of the problem, but the break in the VAT audit trail. 
Accordingly, it recommends the introduction and intensi   cation of cross border 
audits. The third study proposes that changes in the value of exempt immov 
able property should be included in the VAT base. This base extension should re 
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stamp duties that are currently levied on transactions in immovable property.
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